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ABSTRACT
With  the  end  of  Apartheid,  the  South  African  regime  completely  changed.  This  had 
implications for African migration into the country. The migration situation became a concern with 
the appearance of what has been referred to as xenophobia. But except for some particularities, the 
case of South Africa is not so very singular.
Systemic approaches in the field of International Relations have proved to be an interesting 
analytical tool, and Rosenau’s ideas provide the opportunity to use those approaches at different 
levels, applying them to different case of studies. 
The goal of this thesis is first to build a system of analysis for migration issues, explaining 
the interactions between the different actors of the system. The system thus created should be able 
to be applied to many case of migration in different regions of the world. The second chapter seeks 
to apply this system to the case of South Africa, for a clear understanding of the phenomenon of 
African migration to that country. It explains the interests, roles and modes of interaction of the 
different actors such as the state, external actors and migrants. 
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INTRODUCTION: 
South  Africa  experienced  a  racial  discriminatory  regime  for  decades.  Apartheid  was 
supposed to ensure security for the white population by giving lesser rights to non-whites and by 
forcing them to live in different areas. The idea was to not mix the different races. But the regime 
changed in 1994. South Africa became a non-racial democracy. This had many impacts on internal 
aspects of the country but also on immigration and African migration. All South Africans had the 
same rights under a new regime, but these did not apply to African migrants. Of course, there is a 
difference between South African citizens and non-South African citizens. This occurs in all the 
countries of the world. But this differentiation led to a specific type of xenophobia. South African 
blacks and other non-whites got their rights back, but the situation has been different for African 
migrants. For this reason, many studies have focused on immigration in South Africa. South Africa 
is  an  attractive  country  for  African  migrants  as  a  result  of  its  economic  and  political  welfare 
compared to the global political and economic instability in the rest of Africa. For this reason, more 
migrants came at the end of apartheid. But they did not find what they were expecting. Once they 
entered South Africa, they faced many difficulties because of being foreigners. 
In as much as there are many studies about immigration in South Africa, there are different 
approaches. Some focused on the impacts on development, some on the life of immigrants in the 
country, some on the ways to enter South Africa, some on state policies against foreigners, some on 
human rights abuses. However, it seems that in fact, very few changed between 1994 and 2008 
despite different approaches.  Migrants still  face many human rights abuses.  They seek to enter 
South Africa and the state seeks to expel them. It seems that this political phenomenon has been 
stable for fourteen years. Thus, this thesis seeks to explain the phenomenon as a system including 
different actors which try to influence others in order to guarantee their interests. 
In the field of International Relations, many systemic approaches have successfully been 
used to explain state behaviour. Rosenau built a framework of analysis of systems. He explained 
how they function, how to delimit them and therefore how systemic approaches can be applied to 
different political case studies. The systemic approach can then be applied to immigration cases. 
This is the purpose of this thesis. In order to do so, this thesis will draw a model of an immigration 
system from different empirical cases in Europe and North America in the first chapter. Then, it will 
be applied to the case of South Africa. Even if South Africa is a very particular type of country, 
state interaction with African migrants goes through the same process as in other similar cases. 
Also, the systemic approach will include external organisations as a group of actors because they 
have more influence in the International system than they did at one time. 
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I/ South Africa as a country of immigration
South Africa has always been a country of migration. The issue of identity has always been 
a major one in the constitution of the country, of the state. It has been very complex in a country 
where many ethnic groups and races, with a “divided history”1 and culture share the same land. 
When the whites arrived in this land, they could not escape the fact that they were foreigners, like 
the Indians who came to work in the sugar cane fields. Their colour was obviously a sign of their 
immigration.  Therefore,  the  whites  tried  to  limit  it  by  treating  Africans  as  foreigners  as  well. 
According to the official history, blacks would have arrived at almost the same time or even later 
than Europeans in South Africa2.  But some scientific studies demonstrated that in fact, if black 
South Africans are the descendents of the people of the bantu language who migrated to the south 
of the continent, they would have been on this land from the third century in the south of Limpopo3. 
This is why “South Africa seems like a country where everybody would be a foreigner for someone 
else: the English and the Bantu for the Afrikaners, the Afrikaners and the English for the blacks, 
Indians and others for the whites and the blacks”4. In this context, the coloureds have an identity 
that is necessarily shared with a foreigner. The Blacks that come from different ethnic groups could 
also consider other ethnic groups as foreigners. 
After wars over the conquest of the country, between English, Afrikaners, Zulus or others, 
and the complex history of South Africa, the whites finally created a country together. They used 
this power to control immigration, to control citizenship, to control the non-white population of 
South Africa during apartheid. The South African Union built in 1910, “organised progressively its 
immigration  policies:  the  recruiting  of  African  workers  needed  for  mine  industry  extended  to 
neighbouring countries under British or Portuguese domination”5. Later the government Hertzog-
Smuts adopted the Aliens Control Act to prohibit any non-white immigration and to control the 
influx of Jewish immigrants, considered as low type migrants. At the same time, the state was 
looking for Europeans migrants and immigrants. In the 1950's, the regime intensified its efforts to 
recruit qualified immigrants. This population was coming from Europe. The laws for permanent 
residence and citizenship for European migrants were liberal to make sure that qualified immigrants 
would stay. The Department of Home Affairs even placed advertisements in Europe to influence 
workers to come to South Africa. In the meantime, African workers were only used on temporary 
1 Ibid., p. 29
2 The Bantu arrived after the Dutch and English according to the Minister of Information, C. P. Mulder,  in 1975
In Cornevin M., L'apartheid: pouvoir et falsification historique, Unesco, Paris, 1979, p. 79
3 Ibid., p. 83-95
4 Bouillon A., “Immigration and Immigrants in South Africa”, European Review of International Migrations, Vol. 14. 
No. 1, 1998, p. 194
5 Bouillon A., “Immigration and Immigrants in South Africa”, Op. Cit., p. 195
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contracts. Africans could not be immigrants but only migrants. “Black immigration officially did 
not  exist”6.  The  project  of  the  apartheid  system was  to  make  the  black  South  Africans  only 
transitory migrants, with the only reason to be in a white area to work there with a contract. Dr 
Connie Mulder, Minister of Black Affairs, said in 1978 that if the apartheid regime followed its 
policies until their logical conclusions, not a single black would be a South African citizen7. There 
was a total control on black movement and migration with the pass-book in the system of influx 
control. Foreigners were considered as the same as rural illegals. 
The regime and the control of non-white populations could not last. Protests against the 
regime were getting more intense particularly from the mid-1980s to the beginning of the 1990s. 
Some people considered terrorists by the apartheid regime and freedom fighters by the major part of 
the population sought refuge in other countries of Southern Africa and came back after the regime 
change in 1994 led and won by the ANC. Of course, this important change in South Africa had an 
impact  on  issues  of  identity, citizenship and therefore immigration. “The reinvention of  South 
Africa following the 1994 election has been shaped by the state's  construction of a new South 
African  identity”8.  “The  main  modification  (about  immigration)  caused  by  the  transition  is 
structural: it is the erasing of internal borders traced by apartheid and the regional structure for a 
consolidation  of  the  external  borders”9.  In  1994,  South  Africa  re-entered  the  international 
community and signed the 1951 UN Refugee Convention. Refugees were then allowed to come to 
South Africa and to obtain a temporary residence permit. New spaces were opened, new movements 
were happening. Whilst South Africa used to be a closed and controlled society, it has now become 
an open one.  Even  though South  Africa  did not  want  African migrants  to  enter, its  economic 
welfare became an attraction for many African migrants. But a new paradox occurred. “Despite the 
overall legal framework offering migrants in general more rights and guarantees than ever before, 
their  situation  in  terms  of  human  rights  abuses,  economic  and  social  rights  and  day-to-day 
interactions remains a source of concern”10. “Even the anti-immigrants impulse of South Africa's 
first  ever  democratic  state  is  strongly  reminiscent  of  its  undemocratic  predecessor  (but)  South 
Africa  is  increasingly  host  to  a  truly  pan-African  and  global  constituency  of  legal  and 
undocumented migrants”11. 
6 Ibid., p. 197
7 In Reitzes M., “Insiders and outsiders: The reconstruction of citizenship in South Africa”, CPS, Social Policy Series, 
vol. 8 No 1, february 1995, p. 6
8 Peberdy S., “Imagining Immigration: Inclusive Identities and Exclusive Policies in Post-1994 South Africa”, Africa 
Today, Vol. 48, No. 3, Evaluating South African Immigration Policy after Apartheid, Indiana University Press, 
Autumn 2001, p. 29
9 Bouillon A., “Immigration and Immigrants in South Africa”, Op. Cit., p. 201
10 Wa Kabwe-Segatti A. & Landau L. (directed by), Migrations in post-apartheid South Africa, Challenges and 
questions to policy makers, FASOPO (Fond d'Analyse des Sociétés Politiques), November 2006, Paris, p. 18
11 Crush J. & McDonald D. A., “Transnationalism, African immigration and new migrant spaces in South Africa: an 
introduction”, Canadian Journal of African Studies, Vol. 34 No 1, Canadian Association of African Studies, 2000, p. 
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Following this contradiction, in the 1990's,  the Aliens control  Act,  Apartheid's last Act, 
became the “cornerstone of South African immigration policy”12. The ten-year period between 1994 
and 2004 has been crucial in shaping positions and structuring networks on migration issues. “Three 
diverging routes were then followed by various clusters of actors: a Home Affairs rather neo-liberal 
agenda (...) favouring State withdrawal, the sub-contracting of administrative processing of control 
to  employers,  incentives  to  highly  skilled  labour  and  investors  and  accelerated  policy  reform 
simplifying administrative procedures; an interventionist approach in favour of balanced migration 
control (...); a security and sovereignty-centred agenda favoured both by part of the ANC and the 
departments’ medium to lower bureaucratic strata”13.  Despite changes in the conceptions of the 
ANC on immigration issues in  the  last  years,  three elements have characterised  post-apartheid 
immigration policy implementation: the persistence of coercive practices, the hardening of entry 
and control  as  well  as  of  access  to South African citizenship and the  failure  to  transform the 
Department of Home Affairs and other public services in charge of immigrants14. 
African  migrants  still  come  to  South  Africa  and  the  South  African  state,  despite  a 
commitment to democracy and human rights, treats them in contradiction with those principles and 
seeks to send them back to their home countries. South Africa considers African migrants as a 
threat. South Africa imposes an unfavourable system on them. Some would consider that South 
African leaders should have a “moral responsibility”15 for migrants who fled from neighbouring 
countries to South Africa because of their help during apartheid. But the ANC prefers to favour 
nationals. If South Africa was referred to as the 'Rainbow Nation' in the beginning of democracy, 
the  ANC seeks  to  favour  the  non-white  population  through  different  processes  such  as  Black 
Economic Empowerment or Affirmative Action. The purpose is to balance the injustices of the past. 
Instead of helping foreigners who gave help before, the ANC seeks to create a system in favour of 
only a particular part of the South African population which of course does not include African 
migrants. 
14
12 Wa Kabwe-Segatti A. & Landau L. (directed by), Migrations in post-apartheid South Africa, Challenges and 
questions to policy makers, Op. Cit., p. 19
13 Ibid., p. 19
14 Ibid., p. 20
15 Renu Modi considers that South Africa should have a moral responsibility with other neigbouring countries and 
their migrants in South Africa because of their help during apartheid. During this regime, many opponents fled out 
of South Africa to find a refuge in neigbouring countries. 
Modi R., “Migration to Democratic South Africa”, Economic and Political weekly, Vol. 38, No. 18, Published by: 
Economic and Political Weekly, (May 3-9, 2003), p. 1760
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II/ African migrants in South Africa
There are of course different types of immigrants and migrants in South Africa, even within 
the  African  ones.  In  general,  one  can  identify  five  types  of  immigrants  in  the  world:  legally 
admitted  immigrants,  contract  labour  immigrants,  illegal  immigrants,  asylum  seekers  and 
refugees16. In South Africa, it is difficult to ascertain the number of migrants of different categories. 
Different surveys have different statistics, and the state always enlarges the number of migrants in 
order  to  make  it  being  a  bigger  issue  than  it  actually  is.  Therefore,  one  can  only  make 
approximations on the different categories of African migrants in South Africa.  The immigrant 
population in South Africa is now clearly dominated by Africans17
The legally admitted immigrants have to be distinguished from legal migrants. The legal 
migrants come for a short term in the country. They mainly come for tourism or business reasons. 
As can be seen on the following graph, the number of temporary residents in South Africa has 
increased strongly from the beginning of the regime change until now. In the same time, permanent 
immigration permits went from 14,000 per year in 1990 to 4,000 at the end of the 1990s18. 
Table 1
16 Meissner D., “Managing Migrations”, Foreign Policy, No. 86, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1992, 
p. 67
17 In Bouillon A., “Immigration and Immigrants in South Africa”, Op. Cit., p. 214
18 Wa Kabwe Segatti A. & Landau L., “Human Development Report 2009; Human Development Impacts on 
Migration, Case study: South Africa”, Forced Migration Study Programme, For the United Nations Development 
Programme, January 2009, p. 11
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African migrants  that  follow the  way to be  legal immigrants  rarely  get  as  much as  the 
permanent  permits  give.  But  there  are  many  who  use  the  temporary  visit  permits  to  get  the 
opportunity to enter the country and then stay illegally or leave the country and cross the border 
again. “Visits to South Africa are often strategic and temporary”19 for African migrants. 
The category of contract labour immigrants is an important one within the African migrants. 
But the South African state ensures that these migrants are not immigrants. The labour contracts are 
generally for a set period of time. Therefore, the applicants cannot stay in the country after the end 
of their contract. It is in a way the same process which was created by the Chamber of Mines during 
the  colonial  period  and  used  during  apartheid  for  African  workers.  There  were  many  African 
migrants  working in  the mines with  temporary permits  in the  1970's20.  This  number decreased 
strongly because of the mining industry’s decline and the preference for nationals. The workers' 
associations managed to get  better wages.  Therefore, this type of work was more attractive for 
nationals. According to research in 2002 “The mine contract labour system seems as entrenched as 
ever, thousands of migrant labourers have been sent home in the last decade”21. Now, the number of 
African migrants working in mines is very low. They are hired with “short term contracts and few 
(if any) benefits”22.
Illegal immigration remains a concern for an analysis of African migration in South Africa. 
There are many statistics with as many different results. We can however consider that nearly all of 
them come from African countries. There are different types of illegal immigrants in South Africa. 
The ‘stay-overs’ are immigrants who entered the country legally but did not ask for or did not get 
the extension of their permit. Some entered the country illegally with fake permits or by crossing 
borders clandestinely. Mangosuthu Buthelezi, Minister of Home Affairs, declared in parliament that 
there were two million “illegal aliens” in 1994. This number was over estimated. The HSRC did the 
same and declared that they were between three and nine million23. There is no way to be sure today 
of the exact number of illegal migrants in the country because of their illegality. In January 1999, 
Oucho and Crush considered that there were 850,000 illegal immigrants in South Africa24. It seems 
a more realistic number. A “SAMP research has demonstrated that the vast majority of people from 
neighbouring countries who have visited South Africa in the past, as well as those who are currently 
19 Crush J. & McDonald D. A., “Transnationalism, African immigration and new migrant spaces in South Africa: an 
introduction”, Op. Cit., p. 7
20 80% of the mine workers were foreigners in 1970 according to the South African Labour Commission
In Bouillon A., “Immigration and Immigrants in South Africa”, Op. Cit., p. 206
21 Crush J. & McDonald D. A., “Transnationalism, African immigration and new migrant spaces in South Africa: an 
introduction”, Op. Cit., p. 5
22 Ibid., p. 5
23 Bouillon A., “Immigration and Immigrants in South Africa”, Op. Cit., p. 203
24 Crush J. & McDonald D. A., “Transnationalism, African immigration and new migrant spaces in South Africa: an 
introduction”, Op. Cit., p. 6
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in the country, entered legally through official border posts with the necessary documentation”25. 
Therefore, one could believe that South African state institutions give an overestimation of illegal 
migrants. It brings a confusion between legal and illegal migrants. It can be in the interest of the 
state to pretend that there are more illegal migrants than in reality to expel more of them and use 
draconian measures for deportation. 
The last types of immigrants are refugees and asylum seekers. They were new for South 
Africa after  the signing of the 1951 UN refugee convention and the refugee Convention of the 
OAU. As can be seen on the following table26,  the number of refugees and asylum seekers has 
increased  greatly  during  the  post-apartheid  period.  There  have  been  many  more  refugees  and 
asylum seekers seeking refuge in South Africa. The political instability that exists often in African 
countries  and the  commitment  of  South  Africa  to human rights  and democracy created a  new 
destination for refugees and asylum seekers in Africa. But there is a very fine line between the 
status of refugees (and even more so for asylum seekers) and illegal imigrants. Asylum seekers are 
often considered illegal according to the aliens Control Act while waiting for their application to be 
processed. It will be seen that the DHA takes more time than it should be to process the asylum 
seekers’ applications. Therefore, the applicants are treated like illegal immigrants for longer. The 
refugee is more solid in the sense that there is a longer temporary permit which can be legally 
extended.  The  majority  of  asylum seekers  and  refugees  are  Africans.  Their  country  of  origin 
depends on the different wars or other types of political instability and insecurity which happens in 
Africa. They will be considered as part of the same group because of their common and interests in 
coming to South Africa, and because of the same conditions of application despite different origins. 
The same is done with other types of African migrants in this study. 
Table 2
Source: UNHCR, “Country Operation Plan”, Country: South Africa, Year: 2006, 6p. 
25 Crush J. & McDonald D. A., “Transnationalism, African immigration and new migrant spaces in South Africa: an 
introduction”, Op. Cit., p. 6
26 Source: UNHCR, “Country Operation Plan”, Country: South Africa, Year: 2006, p. 2
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III/ The appearance of Xenophobia27
Facing such in inflow of migrants, South Africa chose to use radical measures. By defining 
its identity in opposition with foreigners, the state sought to expel African migrants in different 
ways. If they could not all be deported, the state built a system which does not encourage them to 
come into or to stay in the country. Despite human rights commitments  and the application of 
international  refugee  conventions  in  the  South  African  legal  system,  the  attitude  of  the  South 
African state can be considered as xenophobic towards migrants and immigrants. This attitude has 
been particularly directed at African migrants. The South African state and other related public 
institutions such as the Department of Home Affairs or the SAPS have been unable to manage the 
inflow of African migrants. Their solution is to treat them in a way that does not encourage them to 
enter  the country  or  to  stay, including many human rights  abuses.  This  attitude led to a  crisis 
situation in 2008 usually referred to as the 'xenophobic attacks' The South African let such attacks 
happen.
According  to  a  study  by  the  forced  migration  studies  programme of  the  University  of 
Witwatersrand28, the violence started in Gauteng with violent attacks on foreigners in Alexandra, 
Johannesburg, on May 11 2008. It quickly spread to northern Johannesburg, Ekurhuleni (eastern 
Gauteng), then to central and western Johannesburg and to Randfontein in western Gauteng. On 
May 17 2007, the attacks spread to Durban, in Kwazulu-Natal. In quick succession, incidents were 
reported in Free State, North West and Limpopo provinces on May 20, 21 and 22. On May 22, as 
the violence in Gauteng and Kwazulu-Natal was beginning to subside, attacks against foreigners 
commenced in the Western Cape at DuNoon, Cape Town. In the next four days, “threatened and 
actual violence caused foreign nationals to flee from various communities in Cape Town and further 
afield (including from the townships of Knysna, Mossel Bay, Somerset West, Strand, Hermanus and 
Paarl)”29.  On  May  26,  The  Safety  and  Security  Minister,  Charles  Nqakula,  declared  that 
“xenophobic violence had been brought under control, although isolated attacks continued into the 
subsequent months”30. The key characteristic of the violence was the attacks or threats of attacks on 
non-nationals  living  in  townships  and  informal  settlements  in  the  main  urban  settlements  of 
Gauteng, Western Cape and Kwazulu-Natal. 
27 The word xenophobia has been widely used in many journalistic or academic articles, NGO reports. Even  the 
UNHCR uses it when writing on South Africa. It literally means the of from people other countries. 
28 Monson T., Igglesden V. & Polzer T., Humanitarian Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons in South Africa: 
lessons learned following attacks on foreign nationals in May 2008, Forced Migration Studies Programme, 
University of the Witwatersrand, Oxfam, Johannesburg, January 2009, 187p.
29 Ibid., p. 19
30 Ibid., p. 19
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The victims were people from Bangladesh, Burundi, DRC, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, 
Nigeria,  Pakistan,  Somali  and  Zimbabwe  “as  well  as  South  Africans  from  minority  language 
groups”31. Some South African citizens who were perceived to be foreigners or some spouses of 
foreigners  were attacked as  well.  But  “the vast  majority  of  persons  displaced were of  African 
origin”32. There were only isolated cases where migrants of Asian origin were attacked. In the end, 
62 deaths were reported, mostly in Gauteng, of which a third were South African citizens33. A total 
of 342 shops were reported to have been looted, and 213 burnt down. The estimated total number of 
people displaced range between 80,000 and 200,000. “The range is large due to limited records of 
the numbers of people who left South Africa for their home countries, of those who moved with 
friends  and family or  found alternative  private  accommodation,  or those  who returned to their 
communities in the first two weeks of the disaster”34. The Mozambican state estimated that 40,000 
of their citizens returned home as a result of the violence. The maximum statistics stated that, there 
were 24,000 people in Gauteng and 20,000 in the Western Cape who had to stay in shelters. People 
had been directly threatened and were told to leave the communities in which they were living if 
they did not want to be violated. In the initial phase of displacement, foreigners sought safety in 
police stations, churches, mosques and other private and faith-based facilities. When those facilities 
became overcrowded, the government authorities made available community halls, disused school 
buildings, and other public buildings. Then, the government announced that centralised Centres of 
Safe Shelter would be established by local and provincial government. 
The South African authorities reacted late to this crisis situation. And then, they just left the 
provincial authorities alone to manage it. But they were not able to do so. The help of International 
and civil society organisations was crucial for the safety of the internally displaced foreigners and to 
manage the  situation.  The  South  African  state  allowed xenophobic,  non-legitimated35 and high 
intensity violence towards African migrants. Some violence resembled what might have been done 
to non-whites during apartheid such as letting a human burn in its blanket. This extreme reaction of 
some of the South African population, not blamed by the South African authorities, demonstrated a 
poorly managed immigration inflow and loss of the state power in its control of legitimate violence. 
Such a situation is a proof of dysfunction in the South African state which needs to be understood. 
African  migration  to  South  Africa  is  an  issue  that  needs  clear  analysis  to  understand  it  as 
phenomenon with different actors intervening with their sets of interests and way of action. If the 
31 Monson T., Igglesden V. & Polzer T., Humanitarian Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons in South Africa: 
lessons learned following attacks on foreign nationals in May 2008, Op. Cit., p; 19
32 Ibid., p. 20
33 Ibid., p. 20
34 Ibid., p. 20
35 The attacks of May 2008 were not necessarily directed to illegal migrants.
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situation of African migrants is the way it is now, it is surely and partly due to the South African 
state consideration on immigration. 
METHODOLOGY
In migration, there are different approaches. There are different perspectives and analytic 
frameworks for the studies of migration. In a migration issue, there are populations moving to other 
places, other countries, from different places. Some studies focus on the reasons why a particular 
population moves, others focus on the types of migrants, others seek to understand the integration 
of these populations in their new 'homes'. Migration is an issue that can be studied from various 
different points of view. Meyers36, from the Centre of Migration Studies in New York, suggested a 
comparative approach for the different studies. 
Meyers considers the immigration issue as an interdisciplinary subject which he divides into 
two parts: immigration control policy (rules and procedures governing the selection and admission 
of foreign citizens) and the immigration policy (conditions provided to resident immigrants). The 
approaches he compares are from different fields of studies such as political science or international 
relations. 
The  Marxists  and  neo-Marxists  argue  that  “economic  factors  and  class-based  political 
process  shape immigration policies”37.  If  the  society  is  divided into two classes  (capitalist  and 
proletarian), immigration serves the ruling class in a variety of ways, used like a reserve army to 
“force down working class wages”38. This is how Marxists and neo-Marxists explain migration. But 
if they correctly predict the short term correlation between the economic cycle and immigration 
policy, if they explain foreign worker policies and a part of the accepted illegal immigration which 
benefits employers, there are some limits in their conceptions of immigration. Marxists predict a 
“long term growth of immigration as a structural part of capitalism”39. But labour migration has 
been stopped in Europe and the number of immigrants in the US has not yet reached the level 
expected by the Marxists. They also fail to explain policies on immigration of dissimilar ethnic 
origin. If the Marxists focus on economic factors of migration, they cannot explain refugee issues as 
migrations related to wars and political pressures. 
36 Meyers E., “Theories of International Immigration Policy – A Comparative Analysis”, International Migration 
Review, Vol. 34, No. 4, Center for the Migration Studies of New York, 2000, pp. 1245-12
37 Ibid., p. 1247
38 Ibid., p. 1248
39 Ibid., p. 1250
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The  'national  identity'  approach40 argues  that  the  unique  history  of  each  country,  its 
conception of citizenship and nationality, (...) shape its immigration policy”41. This approach works 
in the field of historical sociology or political sociology. It has particularly been used for the case of 
South Africa because of its specificity as a nation. In America as an example, some could argue that 
social cleavages, social unrest and industrial unrest within American society foster fears of losing 
national  identity  and  of  a  national  breakdown  can  “produce  nationalism  and  nativism 
(xenophobia)”42.  The  'national  identity'  approach  explains  the  variations  in  immigration  and 
citizenship policies between countries of destination on the basis of their different conceptions of 
national  identity.  It  makes  three  types  of  distinctions:  between  settler  societies,  between 
homogeneous and heterogeneous countries, between countries whose citizenship laws lean towards 
jus  sanguinis and those  countries  whose citizenship laws  lean towards  jus  soli43.  The 'national 
identity' approach “contributes to our understanding of immigration policies in several ways”44. It 
explores the cultural idioms and traditions that shape policies. It explains why some countries prefer 
permanent immigration when some others prefer temporary immigration. It  explains how major 
racial, ethnic and religious conflicts within a society influence the attitude of the state towards the 
composition  of  immigration.  But  “the  major  weakness  of  the  national  identity  approach  is  its 
inability to explain the fact that various countries have adopted similar immigration policies at the 
same time”45. This theory can be used to explain why a country is particular in its immigration 
policy. But even though South Africa has a very distinctive history of immigration, racial issues and 
nation building, its position on African migration is not necessarily so distinctive. 
The domestic politics approach46 has been widely employed. “Empirically, it seems evident 
that economic and social factors have a greater impact on immigration policies than do security and 
strategic considerations, which are highlighted by the realist approach”47. But these studies lack a 
general theory. They mostly examine the policy of a single country in a certain period of time and 
therefore  are  not  useful  for  comparison.  It  does  not  explain  immigration  policies  and  refugee 
policies adopted despite domestic opposition. Because of it dogmas, it seems inadequate to explain 
the situation of South Africa where the democracy is led by a single dominant party. 
40 The name of this approach comes from Meyers considerations. It might include different approaches with other 
names. Meyers generalise the different types of approaches focusing on identity issues. 
41 Meyers E., “Theories of International Immigration Policy – A Comparative Analysis”, Op. Cit., p. 1251
42 Ibid., p. 1253
43 The distinction between the jus sanguinis and the jus soli can be considered as the difference between the rights of 
the filiations of the right of the land. In other terms, the jus sanguinis defines citizenship rules through the filiations 
which is of parental or ancestral descent. In other words, when the jus soli is place-bound.
44 Meyers E., “Theories of International Immigration Policy – A Comparative Analysis”, Op. Cit., p. 1255
45 Ibid., p. 1255
46 The domestic politics approach consists of the understanding of the relation between interest groups and partisan 
politics. It seeks to explain how those groups get to power, negotiate, interact and lead a country. It assumes that the 
state serves as a neutral arena for societal interests: interest groups and parties. Policy making is the result of 
bargaining as well as compromises between these interests.
47 Meyers E., “Theories of International Immigration Policy – A Comparative Analysis”, Op. Cit., p. 1259
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Institutional and bureaucratic approaches  still focus on state level interactions. They argue 
that political institutions can be autonomous: “they can form public policy according to the interests 
of the state and remain unaffected by societal or interest group pressures”48.  But the distinction 
between the weak state and the strong state is very vague. Political institutions vary from country to 
country, sector to sector and thus, cannot be generalized. However, such conceptions can be useful 
in the case of South Africa to explain interactions within the state and a dysfunctional immigration 
policy implementation process, mainly implemented by the Department of Home Affairs. 
Realism and  neo-realism empirically  shows  that  issues  of  struggle  and  security  deeply 
influenced immigration policies. There are different examples such as:  passports introduced during 
the First World War, fear of German invasion in France influencing immigration policy, Australia 
and the fear of Asian string immigration after the Japanese invasion, and Jewish immigration in 
Israel. During the Cold War many western countries favoured refugees from communist countries to 
demonstrate their anti-communist commitment. But “the emphasis on national security and military 
conflicts formerly caused most scholars of the realist school to neglect the issue of immigration”49. 
The focus of the realist approach on sovereign self-interest of states seems a good starting point for 
a  discussion on immigration policy. States follow their  own interests  when they restrict  labour 
migration and permanent migration during recession. But “realism has contributed only marginally 
to the study of immigration policy”50 except for refugees. The state is selfish. But is it rational like 
the realists claim? It will be seen that there are different reasons why the state does not always work 
for its own interest. If the realists see the state as a 'black box', it will be an important limit to the 
understanding of the situation of African migrants in South Africa. 
An interesting point of view of liberalism is that it does not consider the state as the only 
actor which intervenes in the immigration system. International organisations have an influence in 
immigration policy. Individuals and communities can play their role as well. 
Globalisation theory51 challenges the sovereignty of  the state “as  well  as  its  capacity to 
control its economic and welfare politics”52. There is an emergence of human rights as a part of the 
migration process. “The globalization literature contributes more to our understanding of the causes 
of immigration and to immigrant and citizenship policies than to the study of immigration control 
policy”53. Globalization theories neglect the influence of politics in comparison to their excessive 
reliance on economic and social forces. 
48 Meyers E., “Theories of International Immigration Policy – A Comparative Analysis”, Op. Cit., p. 1261
49 Ibid., p. 1264
50 Ibid., p. 1265
51 Meyers considers the globalisation theory as a combination between liberalism and world system theories.
52 Ibid., p. 1267
53 Ibid., p. 1268
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Many  approaches  have  been  provided  in  the  analysis  of  migration  cases.  All  of  these 
approaches have both advantages and limits. Some explain reasons for migration, whereas others 
will explain reactions of a host state towards immigration. Some explain state immigration control 
policy, others explain state immigration policy. Some explain through historical and sociological 
approaches why some societies react in one way toward immigration when others react differently. 
But African migration to South Africa seems a more complicated process than just issues of state 
policies or identity conceptions. Immigration can be seen as a phenomenon in which different actors 
interact with different needs and interests. A state might not be able to control its immigration and 
therefore a study on African migration in South Africa cannot only emphasise the reaction of the 
South African state  towards African migrants.  A state might  seek to evict  immigrants and this 
strategy can work in some ways. But a country can be an attractive destination despite state control 
on immigration. Immigrants can still find ways to come into a country, through illegal or legal 
processes. The issue of African migration in South Africa cannot be seen from a single point of 
view. 
If systemic analyses proved to be able to explain many interactions in the world system, 
could a systemic analysis be applied to the case of African migration in South Africa to explain 
needs, interests, ways of action and influence, results and the organisation of the different actors 
who take part of the immigration issue? World systems analyses cannot explain this issue with a full 
understanding because its perspective is  too broad.  A systemic analysis cannot be used from a 
globalised point of view. But as Rosenau understood, systemic analyses do not necessarily have to 
be made from a globalised point of view. There are different systems in the world system. From his 
understanding and conceptions on the systemic approach and the functioning of systems, we can 
apply  a  systemic  approach  to  different issues.  Therefore,  it  becomes  possible  for  the  issue  of 
African migration to South Africa. The first need to apply this approach to this issue is to draw a 
model of the functioning of such a system. The first  chapter of this thesis will build a general 
system on the immigration issue and explain the different interactions between and within the actors 
who  are  active  in  this  ‘issue-area’.  Different  cases  of  immigration  around  the  world  will  be 
considered for empirical and comparative support. The second chapter will apply this system to the 
case of South Africa. This application will give a chance to conclude whether the systemic approach 
should be considered as an explainatory analytic tool for migration issues. The advantage of the 
systemic  approach  seems  to  be  that  it  gives  an  understanding  of  the  entire  phenomenon.  The 
conceptions  of  the  stability  of  the  system  will  give  an  explanation  for  possible  changes  in 
immigration in a certain area. It will explain how actors interact and therefore influence others as it 
is the base of any change or continuity. 
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Chapter 1
From the conceptions of Rosenau:
The construction of an analytic system for migration
The purpose of this chapter is to understand where systemic approaches come from and how 
they  can be  used.  It  includes a  look at  the  different systemic  approaches  used in  the  field  of 
International Relations. From this beginning, this thesis will  try to explain the functioning of a 
political system according to the conceptions of Rosenau. After that, it will seek to build a particular 
system for the purpose of analysing migration issues. In will include two approaches; the horizontal 
one will look at actors as unit to explain their interactions as a whole, and the vertical one will seek 
to open the ‘black box’ and look inside the actors. By knowing the composition of an actor, its 
functioning, its capacity of influence in the system can clarified. 
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Section 1 - Conceptualization and model of a system: Rosenau's approach
The  systemic  analysis  presents  many  advantages  as  an  analytic  tool.  It  has  been  used 
specifically  in  the  field  of  international  relations  in  order  to  explain  state  behaviour  in  the 
international  system.  It  is  because  of  such  advantages  that  we  will  apply  it  to  the  field  of 
immigration. With regards to systemic approaches, Rosenau applies this analytical tool to studies 
other than international relations. Rosenau widens the use of systems for different fields and levels. 
It thus could be interesting to look at its  stance on international relations before explaining the 
functioning of a system. Since Rosenau studies international relations, he provides an opportunity to 
apply a systemic analysis to the issue of immigration or other fields by proposing a method to 
delimit a system and understand its interactions and rules. 
I/ Theories of International Relations: 
The analytic advantages of the systemic approach
In the study of International Relations, the issue of systems is a major one from an analytic 
perspective.  One  of  the  first  major  authors  theorising  it  was  Raymond  Aron.  He  called  an 
international system “the ensemble constituted by political units that maintain regular relations with 
each other and that are all capable of being implicated in a generalized war”54.  If “a political system 
is  defined  by  an  organization, by the  reciprocal  relations of  the  parties,  by  the  cooperation of 
elements, by the rules of government, to what degree do we find the equivalent in the case of an 
international system?”55 He tried to apply those systemic conceptions to the cases of international 
relations in which the number of states/actors can be over one hundred. His systemic analysis takes 
into consideration different systems during world history. He often takes examples of the Greek 
city-states,  and considers that since 1945 the international system “includes the entire planet”56. 
Then, there are different characteristics in an international system. The first one according to Aron, 
is  the  configuration  of  the  relation  of  forces  which  is  defined  mainly  by  politico-military 
participation. Then, it would be the homogeneous or heterogeneous characteristic of the system. 
This is a particular conception of Aron's. He explains that “the distinction between homogeneous 
54 Aron R., Peace and War: A theory of International Relations, Calmann-Lévy, Paris, 1962, p. 94
55 Ibid., p. 94
56 Ibid., p. 95
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and heterogeneous systems seems (...) fundamental”57. With this distinction, he explains the reasons 
for stability and use of military force within the system. Another characteristic of an international 
system is the distinction between a Transnational Society and International Systems. Some actors 
can be part of the same system without having commercial exchanges for example, which is a 
feature of transnational societies. Finally, the last characteristic includes knowing if the system is 
legalized or not (rules applied without laws).
Once those concepts have been developed by Aron, he focuses on two different types of 
international systems to explain states’ foreign policies, multipolar systems and bipolar systems. In 
each of them, the rules of interaction between the actors are different in terms of  relations of power 
and force as well as the balance of power, the equilibrium of the system. He considers that because 
of the International system (the environment of the state), states' foreign policies are created in a 
certain way. Therefore, the system has a direct influence on the actors. One of the major issues of 
systemic  approaches  is  to  know which  type  of  system influences  which  type  of  policies,  and 
therefore, which system creates stability.
.
The issue of stability of systems is particularly important in the realists' conceptions as well. 
Solomon considers  realism “as the best suited tool to understand the turbulent world in which we 
live”58. Realists consider the state as the “primary actor in world politics”59. The state is struggling 
for its own survival as it lives in an anarchic environment. It will try to get the necessary military 
force  to ensure  its  security. Balance of  power  then becomes the  favoured realist  technique for 
conflict management. The stability of the world system partly depends in this balance of power. 
There is a dual relation between the state and the system. The structural  realists like K. Waltz 
consider the system as a determinant of state behaviour. R. Gilpin, a realist who adds economic 
perspectives to the realist's theories, recognises the principle of K. Waltz’s anarchic system. This 
system  is  anarchic  because  there  is  no  organ  superior  to  the  sovereignty  of  the  states.  It  is 
systemically like the  state of nature in Rousseau's theories. Individuals are alone in an anarchic 
system.  According to R. Gilpin, “individual behavior is explained by the nature of the system” 
which is “the primary determinant”60. The system explains the behaviour of the state for realists. 
And the state will seek the stability of the system for its own security or will try to change the 
system if it has an interest in doing so. 
Then, a massive debate between the realists has been the issue of the stability of the system. 
Which type of system is the most stable, creating less wars and more security for states and which 
57 Ibid., p. 99
58 Solomon H.,  “In Defense of Realism: Confession of a Fallen Idealist”, African Security Review, Vol. 5, No. 2, 1996, 
p. 1
59 Ibid., p. 2
60 Gilpin R., War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1981, p. ix
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types of states? They posed those questions. Waltz considers that the most stable system is bipolar. 
Using the example of the two superpowers during the Cold War, he explains that it is very stable 
because they both deter the other from making war. They both control the other. From an empirical 
perspective, he justifies it by the fact that the USSR and the USA did not fight directly together and 
did not lead to another global war. Gilpin considers the hegemonic position as the most stable 
system. Looking at the cycles of hegemony in War and Changes in World Politics, he explains that 
a state will  change the system if it  has an interest  doing so, to get a better position. Once the 
hegemonic position has been reached by a state, it will organize the system according to its own 
interest and guarantee in return, the stability and security of the system. Therefore, the hegemony 
should be the most stable. But some others consider the multipolar or oligopolistic systems as the 
most stable and most pragmatic. It consists of a few poles of power in the system that control one 
another. With there only being a few, it is easier to create rules and laws on how to behave within 
the system.
Even  with  this  debate,  realism  has  been  considered  as  a  paradigm  in  the  field  of 
International  Relations,  the  master  in the  realm of  World Politics.  It  is  because their  scientific 
approach of the International Relations gave a better understanding and a clear analytic framework. 
If they were able to explain states behaviours, such as the Cold War, it is because of their systemic 
approach. And is political analysis not about understanding the behaviour of actors in a specific 
way?
Buzan and Little pursued the systemic analysis in International Relations. But they went 
further. In  International Systems in World History: Remaking the study of International Relations,  
they attempt to explain World History through a systemic analysis. They explain that their “central 
idea was that international system was the key to the whole subject of International Relations”61. 
When writing about International Relations, they state what Aron could have done. They consider 
that international systems are not necessarily global. The systemic analysis does not only have to be 
applied to the global world. It can also explain behaviours of political actors before the 20th century. 
This is what Buzan and Little attempted to do. They adapted the units, the modes of interaction, the 
process  and the  structure  to  a  different period  of  history, to  make  the  framework  general  and 
adaptable. They can thus use a systemic approach to explain the interactions, the rise and falls and 
the  stability  of  civilizations  through  history, from the  City-States  and  Empires  of  Europe,  the 
nomadic tribes and their empires, to the new international system post Cold War. 
If the systemic approaches have been so successful in the studies of international relations, it 
is because they present some clear advantages. If the realists' theories were considered as a dogma 
61 Buzan B. & Little R., International Systems in World History: Remaking the study of International Relations, 
Oxford University Press, New York, 2000, p. vii
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in  the  International  Relations  studies,  it  is  partly  because  of  their  systemic  approach,  a  well 
recognized analytic  framework.  The systemic frameworks objectively  analyse the  behaviour  of 
different  units/actors  through  power  relations.  Therefore,  they  give  a  clear  view  of  interests, 
possibilities and interactions between the different actors. Like Buzan and Little or Aron did, the 
systemic approach can be applied to different units other  than states  in a  modern international 
system. It gives the opportunity to keep the advantages of the systemic approach for other studies. 
Rosenau takes cognisance of this point when he builds a framework on the functioning of systems 
which can be applied to different cases.
II/ Conceptions and changes in International Relations studies 
proposed by J. N. Rosenau 
James N. Rosenau appears to be hard to classify in the realm of International Relations. 
However, his work is close to the realists in the systemic approach. But throughout his work, he 
continuously tries to modify their framework and conceptions in general in International Relations 
in order to build a better analytic framework. As an example, Fukuyama explains that once again, 
Rosenau considers that the way politics is studied has to change “due to a number of long-term 
shifts  in underlying conditions”62.  Rosenau personally involves himself  in  order to improve the 
quality of world politics studies. From a systemic approach, he tries to modify the systems, their 
actors, their participation and interaction. He offers a different approach about systems which is 
more flexible and realistic. 
First, he considers that Foreign policy is an adaptation to the environment63. A state will 
adapt its policy according to the international system. But as an actor, it can also be influenced by 
the system. Changes can occur. They can be in an internal, personal, political or socioeconomic 
manner, depending on external factors. The influences and changes can also happen to different 
actors. An important point in Rosenau's work is that the state has less power than it used to have. It 
is because of “cascading interdependence”. The process consists “in those dynamics that conduce to 
systemic integration on the one hand and systemic disintegration on the other, to centripetal forces 
that today are making groups and nations more and more interdependent even as centrifugal forces 
are increasingly fragmented them into subgroups and subnations”64. He considers that there is an 
62 Fukuyama F., review work about J. N. Rosenau, Along the Domestic-foreign frontier, Exploring Governance in a 
turbulent world, In Foreign Affairs Vol. 77 No. 2, (March-April 1998), Council on Foreign Relations, p. 143
63 Rosenau J. N., “Foreign policy as adaptive behavior: Some preliminary notes for a theoretical model”, Comparative 
Politics, Vol. 2, No. 3 (April 1970), City University of New York, p. 365
64 Rosenau J. N., “A Pre-Theory Revisited: World Politics in an era of Cascading Interdependence”, International 
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increasing complexity of global interdependence. The international system is more complex than 
just a bipolar or multipolar form. Throughout the evolution of the system, interactions occur not 
only between states: some subgroups and subnations interact in what he calls subsystems. Because 
of that as well as the rise of other actors, states have less power in World Politics. He draws a model 
of the systems, subsystems and their interaction pre and post interdependence65. In this new system, 
the redistribution of power which gives the opportunity to influence, goes through the same process 
as when a hegemon declines66. The interdependence might be partly due to the decline of the USA. 
“In this context, governments are posited as increasingly ineffective as international actors 
and  individuals  as  increasingly  skilled  in  their  public  roles”67.  Therefore,  theories  must  adapt 
themselves  to  this  new  situation,  including  a  consideration  of  “multi-actor  situations  (and) 
encompass the dynamics whereby roles and their scenarios get aggregated into collectivities and the 
process whereby the collectivities then adapt to threats and challenges”68. Collectivities should be 
considered  as  actors  influencing  the  interdependence  in  the  world  system.  And  Rosenau  goes 
further in this idea. He even considers himself, as a scholar, and his work as being interactive with 
the system. Observers influence in one way. Observers can be from different types like some of the 
UN, of the EU or human rights organisations. He explains that even individuals take part in the 
interaction in the international system. In  A new dynamism in world politics: increasingly skillful  
individuals, Rosenau and Fagen explain that “(their) inquiry is to explore systematically whether 
individuals  are becoming more equipped to play a  central  role in world affairs”69.  At  different 
levels, individuals become more capable when they become more skilled. And throughout the 20 th 
century, individuals became more skilled therefore more capable of acting in world affairs. Their 
systemic influence takes place in foreign affairs, international trade and human rights. But it also 
includes the “skill revolution”70 that makes the “public around the world much more resistant to 
authority and better able to organize, (...) the explosion of non-governmental actors, the erosion of 
Studies Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 3 (sept. 1984), Blackwell, p. 256
65 Rosenau is building a model of the 'Waning system' and the 'Emerging system'. They display world politics in terms 
of two national systems, their governments and two of their nongovernmental subsystems. Both figures indicate 
together  state to state diplomatic relations and those that occurs through bureaucratic agencies, together economic 
aid, propaganda and other programs directed at public and nongovernmental institutions, the interactions between 
systems and their subsystems and the transnational dimension of intersocietal relations. But in the 'Emerging 
system', tensions between a system and its subsystem, interaction between sets of interactions rather than actors, 
occur. Those new interactions in the second figure become part of the internal and international systems and 
therefore change the structure of international relations. They are part of the interdependence between the different 
actors.
In Rosenau J. N., “A Pre-Theory Revisited: World Politics in an era of Cascading Interdependence”, Op. Cit., p. 260
66 Ibid., p. 248
67 Ibid., p. 245
68 Ibid., p. 281
69 Rosenau J. N. & Fagen W. M., “A new dynamism in World Politics: Increasingly skillful individuals”, International 
Studies Quarterly, Vol. 41, No. 4 (December 1997), Blackwell, p. 655
70 Rosenau J. N., Along the Domestic-foreign frontier, Exploring Governance in a turbulent world, Cambridge 
University Press, New York, 1997, p. 275
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sovereignty, and the break down of clear boundaries between domestic and foreign”71. Fukuyma 
considers that “the most interesting argument of Rosenau (in Along the Domestic-foreign frontier, 
Exploring Governance in a turbulent world) is that international governance no longer necessarily 
centres on nation-states hammering out  broad international  agreements but  can bubble up from 
below, where private-sector and nongovernmental players have a large role”72. 
Agreeing with Fukuyama, the systemic approach of Rosenau is more realistic than others 
and the  complexity  of his  system concords with  the complexity  of  modern world politics.  His 
conceptions give an opportunity to apply a systemic approach to a different level other than world 
systems.  Including  actors  such  as  population,  International  organisations,  departments  and 
ministries, Rosenau gives us the chance of using a systemic approach to studies other than global 
systems and international relations. As we saw before, the systemic approach is a brilliant analytic 
framework.  It  explains  the  interaction between different actors  and hence,  their  behaviour. But 
before that, it is necessary to know how a system functions and how to delimit it.
III/ The functioning of international systems
The theory of Rosenau
By trying again to improve the quality of political science in the domain of International 
Relations, Rosenau in  The functioning of international systems73, explains that there are different 
malpractices  made  by  scientists.  Hence,  he  tries  specifically  to  understand  and  modify  the 
conception of a system. Rosenau has a particular vision of a system, which is wider than different 
approaches. 
The  first  malpractice  is  the  tendency  to  treat  international  systems  as  all-encompassing 
rather  than  a  political  system  which  is  socially  larger. Rosenau  considers  that  the  “kind-of-
interaction” mode is more relevant to study than the “kind-of-actors” mode to build a system. Thus, 
it can include different actors, not necessarily states, like nations, governments or other units of 
action. Considering that politics  is  an attempt to modify behaviour, he explains that  a  political 
system would be considered as existing when two or more actors are trying to modify each others’ 
71 Fukuyama F., Review work, Op. Cit., p. 143
72 Ibid., p. 143
73 Rosenau J. N., “The functioning of International Systems”, Background, Vol. 7, No 3 (November 1963), Published 
by Blackwell, pp. 111-117
25
behaviour. Research could work on communities as states.  And this  is  exactly the point of the 
systemic study of immigration. We could consider communities of immigrants as an actor, a part of 
the system, because of their interactions with others. This is because immigrant communities do 
interact with the receiving state. Even if they are submitted to the laws of the state more than they 
influence policies, they are still in a direct relation with the state as subjects. Also, demonstrations 
are an attempt to influence the state and the democratic system. Then, in a system like the one 
Rosenau conceptualises, any actor which gives us a broad perspective of the system we could build 
to analyze the phenomenon of immigration in a political sense, can be studied. 
The second 'malpractice'  in  International Relations according to Rosenau, is  due to “the 
unclear  distinction between political  and non-political  forms of  interaction”74.  If  actors  tend to 
modify  behaviour  of  others,  it  brings  about  changes  in  the  systems:  social  ones  (and  thus 
international),  which  are  about  to  collapse  to  become  different  systems.  Those  non-political 
interactions mean that a system can include such relations done by actors that are not considered as 
necessarily political. It could be a population, whose goals could be social. It widens the study of 
systems. And if this system is on the verge of collapsing, it  does not necessarily means that it 
wouldn’t be followed by another one in the same issue-area. A new system can appear with the 
same actors but with new rules, interactions and power relations. There are always adjustments and 
changes “that occur both within systems and within their environment”75. Inside one system, for 
example  the  global  world,  there  are  different  systems,  with  different  rules.  Remaining  with 
Rosenau’s examples, the relation between the USA and the old Yugoslavia is different from that of 
China and the UN. There are different rules even if they are part of the same international system. 
The rules can be codified in some issue-areas but not necessarily. If some rules are codified for 
example by international  laws, we have to look at the implementation of those rules.  Are they 
implemented? To what extent? Are there procedures to check their implementation and pressures in 
order to ensure their application? The state as a sovereign actor will seek to follow the freedom of 
its sovereignty. Thus, the rules will be applied through a power relation where actors try to modify 
the behaviour of others. This will be carried out to suit their goals and interests using their way of 
action and pressure.
One can thus question the particularity of South Africa and Southern Africa. When it comes 
to  immigration,  does  the  system include South  Africa,  immigrants and external  actors  that  are 
different from other parts of the world? Rosenau considers then that the system should be delimited 
“in terms of either the types of actors that participate or the types of interaction in which they are 
74 Rosenau J. N., “The functioning of International Systems”, Op. Cit.,  p. 114
75 Ibid., p. 115
26
engaged”76. The area of our system would be immigration. Thus, we could compare the situation of 
South Africa with other cases in the same issue area. The rules might be the same in a similar 
situation.  And  this  is  why, from a  comparative  perspective  of  the  global  world,  the  systemic 
approach seems to be the best.  
Rosenau provides a list of key questions to delimit the system77: 
 “When an international system is viewed from the perspective of X issue-area (immigration in 
our study), are all of its members active?” This means that some actors might not be active in a 
way. If we consider immigrants as an actor, they might be considered as inactive because of 
their lack of unity, organisation and political possibilities of influence. Also inside the external 
actor, a part of it depends on the existence of organisations working in the issue-area. If they do 
not exist, they can not be active. Otherwise, the other actors will be active. We will consider 
three types of actors: state, external actors (IOs and NGOs) and immigrants.
 “Does  the  number  of  participating  members  remain  constant  each  time  the  issue-area  is 
activated?” In the issue-area of immigration, it appears that all actors remain constant. However, 
some new NGOs or IOs can appear. For example, an IO working in Human Rights protection 
that  was  not  allowed  to  work  in  the  country  of  the  case  study. If  the  State  gives  it  the 
authorization to work inside its borders, a new actor enters the system, but as part of the same 
group. This could also occur if the state opens its relations with another state to negotiate a 
treaty or a protocol about the issue-area. 
 “If not, what determines which members precipitate and sustain interaction in the area?” The 
actors that are participating in our system will remain constant because they are working on an 
issue that continuously exists even if it can occur at different levels. However, the immigration 
process can change. If a state opens its borders then, new immigrants will enter and be another 
actor. 
 “Does it elicit the participation of a bloc of actors?” A bloc of actors in the immigration issue-
area would be  SADC or other states' unions as a bloc of state/actors.
 “What role do international organizations play in the issue-area?” This study will examine their 
role as an actor, which tries to influence the behaviour of others, and that is in line with the 
goals  and  interests  of  the  'international  community'.  This  role  is  generally  linked  to  the 
conception of Human Security and protection of Human Rights.
 “Can  they  (International  Organisations)  activate  the  area?”  They  can  in  the  issue  of 
immigration.  If  for  example,  a  massive  migration  happens  in  a  political  context  of  crisis, 
76 Rosenau J. N., “The functioning of International Systems”, Op. Cit., p. 116
77 Ibid., p. 116-117
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International Organizations can activate the area in the sense that they will try to protect the 
migrants/refugees,  by building facilities,  ensuring their  safety and negotiating with states or 
actors. Their appearance in the system and their expectations can activate the area even if it does 
not change the process.
 “Do they ever precipitate its de-activation?” In the issue-area of immigration, it does not seem 
to be in the interest  of an  IO to de-activate the  system. They try to activate it  to  have an 
influence on it according to their goals.
 “Do particular types of action such as public speeches, quiet consultations, or shows of force, 
characterize the interaction pattern of which comprises the area?” There are certain types of 
actions in immigration systems which would not necessarily be used in other systems. Similarly, 
there are actions in those other systems which would not be used in the immigration issue- area 
either. If the display of force is to be used as an example, one could say that this is an action that 
would not be used in the military sense. The use of force would be done by the state. In this 
case, it would not be used like it would be in a war situation. But it can be useful as a security 
process and to organise border control and registration. The immigration issue-area does not 
appear to have one type of action which characterises the system. There exist different ones: the 
use of police, public speeches, reports, protests, implementation of policies and legal process 
and threats.
 “Are  the  participating  actors  in  X  issue-area  responsive  to  non-governmental  opinion  and 
pressures?” Yes. The state actor will be responsive to international organizations such as the UN 
adhering to different treaties and engagements that it signed.
 “If so, to what extent?” This answer will depend on the nature of the treaties, the engagement 
relevant and the potential pressure to implement the treaty.
 “Or do they give paramount opinion to external factors?” In a system involving a state and other 
actors, the state will necessarily try to act in relation to its sovereignty and take the least amount 
of consideration  possible for external factors.
 “Do the  individuals  or  agencies  who  act  on  behalf  of  system actors  on  X issue-area  also 
represent  the actors in other  issue-areas?” Yes. This  is  the case for some of the actors like 
international  organisations  and  some  individuals  or  agencies  of  states/actors  such  as  a 
representative of a government.
 “Do military agencies play a role in the decisions and action through which system members 
participate  in  the  area?”  No,  except  in an  extreme crisis  situation (internal  instability, war, 
immigration as a major threat). In the issue-area of immigration, the issues of security are not in 
the traditional security framework, including the use of force. The military as an actor is not a 
determinant in the stability of the system and the interactions between the other actors. 
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 “Or  is  the  identity  of  the  participants  dependent  on  variables  other  than  the  nature  of  the 
system?” The actors of the system are pre-existent to this system. They are involved in other 
systems and particularly the state actor and the IO and NGOs. But in the case of the immigration 
issue-area, it is because of the nature of the system that they are getting involved in it. 
 “Does the stability of the system in X issue-area undergo continuous fluctuations? If so, how 
much? And why?” In the immigration issue-area, fluctuations can appear. If for example, the 
state concludes a new international treaty, the kind of interaction between it and other states 
and/or IO can change. It can also bring another actor in the system who will try to influence the 
others according to its goals and expectations. But those fluctuations are not continuous. It is 
usually a system which remains stable. 
 “To what extent  are the integrative potentials  of  the system realized in X issue-area?” The 
integration of new actors relies mainly on the state, apart from immigrants that might intervene 
in the system by crossing frontiers illegally, despite restrictive policies.
 “Is the functioning of the system in the area self-contained? Or are its operations and stability 
affected by the processes and outcomes of interactions in other issue-areas?” The immigration 
phenomenon can change according to situations in other countries like war, political instability 
or economic crisis. But in fact, it  will  only change the amount of immigrants.  Then, if this 
number becomes too important for the receiving country, it can have influences on the state 
policies related to immigration and immigrants.  
Those questions and answers delimitating the system give us part of the rules and conditions of 
the system studied in the issue-area. “Equipped to analyze”78, the systemic approach will give us an 
understanding of the immigration phenomenon as Rosenau's 'issue-area'. 
The third  malpractice  is  the tendency to  overlook non-violent  systems processes  and to 
confine analysis to those involving the use and restraint of force. The question in our system will be 
to know if there is use of force. It is clear that the state as an actor benefits from the “monopoly of 
legitimate violence” according to Weber's expression. Thus, it can use force against immigrants. 
And this happens with forced deportation and detentions. But a system in the immigration issue-
area is not necessarily a violent system. Force is used to guarantee state security. But there is no 
conflict between two or more military forces. 
Lastly, the question of stability is  essential  in  the systemic studies.  Is  the system being 
studied a stable one? If  yes,  it  is  going to remain stable? Rosenau explains that it  is wrong to 
consider that most of the systems are stable when he considers that most of them are on the verge of 
collapsing. Then, if the system studied collapses, it would mean that the type-of-interaction between 
78 Rosenau J. N., “The functioning of International Systems”, Op. Cit., p. 117
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the actors will  change.  If  one considers the use of violence by the South African state against 
immigrants  as  being opposed  to  international  engagements  (e.g.  the  convention of  1951  about 
refugees), the change of interaction could be a positive one for the security of immigrants. But if the 
interactions change, and thus the system collapses, it does not mean that the system will disappear. 
It  would  just  mean  that  new  types,  interactions  and  rules  would  become  part  of  the  system, 
according to Rosenau’s key questions. 
The conception of Rosenau helps to delimit the system. Using those concepts, we will have 
a delimited system of study in which we will apply two approaches. There will be a horizontal one 
looking at the interaction of actors as an entity and a vertical one focusing on their organisation and 
thus their  possibilities of action. If the Horizontal  approach could be an application of realists’ 
theories  in  terms  of  considering  actors  like  units,  we  have  to  explain  the  rules.  If  there  are 
interactions between the different actors, what are their possibilities, and options to influence the 
others? What can they do? What are their responsibilities if there are any (e.g. UN trying to impose 
a system, Human security...)?
Then, another part of the systemic analysis will be to understand the organisation of each 
actor. How does the UN work? How, as a single actor, does the state organize and implement 
policies. Is it unified? The same question can be applied to immigrants: are they unified? Those 
questions will be studies in the 'vertical approach'. 
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Section 2 – The Horizontal Approach: 
Interaction between actors as units in the immigration system
The 'Horizontal approach' consists of looking at the interaction between the different actors 
in the system. Rosenau explains that the interaction mode is more relevant than the actor mode. 
Thus we will try to explain the different types of interaction between the different actors of the 
system who try to influence each other. In this part, the aim is not to focus on subsystems and the 
organisation of the actors. Instead, we will look at the actors one by one, as units of analysis: the 
state, the external actor and the immigrants.
I/ The state or group of states: The major actor 
and its complex interaction with immigrants
The host state, that which immigrants enter, is the major actor of the immigration system. It 
decides on rules of immigration and the conditions under which immigrants can enter or not. It is 
directly concerned with immigrants through issues of security, employment, the need for workers or 
intelligence, and national identity. When dealing with immigrants, the host state is usually the main 
actor deciding on their situation. It can do the same for external actors. At first, the state decides 
whether  or  not  it  wants  to  interact  with  external  actors  due  to  the  principle  of  sovereignty  in 
International  Relations.  According  to  our  systemic  approach,  we  will  have  to  answer  those 
questions concerning the state/actor: what is the interest of the state? Does it have the power to 
guarantee its interest? How could it do so and with what kind of interaction with immigrants? 
Firstly, the interest of the state in the immigration issue is to keep its skilled population and 
attract those of other countries. It can be done through regional integration. This is what the EU did, 
as a successful example. Solomon notices that “countries of Southern Europe (Italy, Greece, Spain 
and Portugal) ceased to export their “surplus labour” to the more affluent countries of Northern 
Europe  as  a  direct  result  of  EU  regional  integration”79.  “This  effectively  decreased  wage 
79 Solomon H., “Strategic perspectives on illegal immigration into South Africa”, African Security Review, Vol. 5, No. 
4, 1996, p. 11
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differentials and generally increased economic and social homogeneity within the EU”80. And even 
if the states are still playing a major role within the EU concerning strategies of keeping skilled 
workers and getting foreign ones, the EU could be playing a bigger one. “The EU 15 immigrants 
have a weaker average qualification than immigrants in the rest of the OECD”81. The great minds of 
Europe often leave for better wages to the great nations of immigration like the USA, Canada or 
Australia. Therefore, the EU has to compensate for this brain-drain by getting skilled workers from 
other countries. This is often done through skilled Africans. But at the end, “the net effect is very 
small compared to those great immigration nations”82. The EU in this competition is a “potentially 
important actor”83 because it has restrictive immigration policies and its role regarding immigration 
of skilled workers can be crucial for the state members. Building a group of state organisations can 
resolve an emigration issue and help getting skilled workers as an immigration strategy for the 
state/actor. 
Most of the time, states prefer to fully use their sovereignty, the concept of freedom for 
individuals  applied  to  states  in  the  international  system.  As  selfish  actors,  they  do  not  feel  it 
necessary  give  a  part  of  their  sovereignty  to  another  institution  and  so  they  try  to  resolve 
immigration problems alone. Even inside the EU, states have their own immigration policies due to 
different requirements and relating to varying societal considerations. If the EU is seen as a useful 
organisation for attracting skilled workers, the organisational requirements and different needs of 
each state makes it too complicated to be the primary actor dealing with the immigration process84. 
It  could happen that  a state needs workers and then it  will  open its borders. But also,  it  could 
confront the problem where it receives too many immigrants that are not needed. To be sure of 
getting immigrants that are in keeping with its needs only and therefore its interests, the state will 
seek to control the immigration process. 
This is what France and Germany tried to do. After the Second World War, they both needed 
workers  to  build  the  country. But  before the  oil  shock of  1973,  they both,  “in  order  to avoid 
xenophobic reactions, attempted to regain control of the migratory process”85. As a response to the 
80 Solomon H., “Strategic perspectives on illegal immigration into South Africa”, Op. Cit., p. 11
81 Docquier F., Lohest O., Marfouk A., “Union Européenne et migrations internationales: l'UE 15 contribue-t-elle à 
l'exode des travailleurs qualifiés?”, (“The Contribution of the EU 15 to the international mobility of skilled 
workers”), Revue Economique, Vol. 56, No. 6: Localisation, Migrations et Institutions,  Sciences Po University 
Press, Paris, p. 1304
82 Docquier F., Lohest O. & Marfouk A., “Union Européenne et migrations internationales: l'UE 15 contribue-t-elle à 
l'exode des travailleurs qualifiés?”, Op. Cit., p. 1302
83 Ibid., p. 1303
84 See Ireland P., “Demander la lune: La participation politique des immigrés dans la communauté européenne” 
(“Asking for the Moon: The Political Participation of Immigrants in the European Community”),  Revue 
Européenne des Migrations Internationales, Vol. 10, No. 1, 1994, pp. 127-144
85 Hollifield J. F., “Immigration Policy in France and Germany: Outputs versus Outcomes”, Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 485, From Foreign “Workers to Settlers? Transnational Migration and 
the Emergence of New Minorities”, Sage Publications, May 1986, p. 117
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political-economic climate change, France and Germany’s governments suspended immigration and 
the recruitment of foreign workers (a decision welcomed by the employers' association). They even 
encouraged workers to return to their home country and attempted to integrate into the host society 
those workers and their family who had been working and living in the country for a specified 
period of time. In 1976, the French government applied a policy which paid foreign workers so that 
they could afford to return to their home country. Between 1977 and 1979, 76 000 foreigners used 
this policy. Some states would deport immigrants using their military or police forces. But in both 
countries, the number of foreign workers and the foreign population continued to increase strongly. 
Policies had the opposite effect to what was expected because they “created new inflows of family 
members and, in the case of France, seasonal workers”86. Using the cases of France and Germany, 
Hollifield explains that there is a strong gap between outputs (immigration policies) and outcomes 
(results of those policies). The migratory process is too complex for regulation “primarily because 
of  misconceptions about the conjunctural  role of  foreign labour and a misunderstanding of  the 
dynamics of the migratory process”87. 
Hollifield considers that “immigration policy is a measure of the strength of the state”88. But 
Germany and France are not weak states. And if they cannot control the immigration process, we 
can  hypothetically  consider  that  they  might  have  an  interest  in  immigration.  Indeed,  they  are 
looking for skilled immigrants. In response to this paradox, Joppke, when he recognised the gap 
between  immigration  policies  and  real  immigration,  explains  that  liberal  states  benefit  from 
immigration89.  And  it  is  maybe  what  Italy  understood  when  it  created  this  policy:  the  liberal 
Martelli law in 199090. This is also why Canada developed a voluntaristic policy on immigration91. 
And even if Joppke recognises that there is a gap between policies and their outputs, he considers 
that liberal states like the U.S.A. have the power to control their borders. 
In  the  USA,  the  immigration  from  Mexico,  specifically  of  illegal  migrants,  has  been 
86 Hollifield J. F., “Immigration Policy in France and Germany: Outputs versus Outcomes”, Op. Cit., p. 126
87 Ibid., p. 127
88 Ibid., p. 115
89 Joppke C., “Why Liberal States Accept Unwanted Immigration”, World Politics, Vol. 50 No. 2, John Hopkins 
University Press, 1998, pp. 266-293
90 The liberal Martelli law gave the opportunity for illegal immigrant to regularize their presence irrespective of their 
employment status. It has been considered as a success bringing immigrants back to a legal status. Therefore, they 
could get employed through the same process as Italians, and get through the tax system. States deciding such 
policies are rare. It seems like letting immigrants obtaining a legal status when they were illegal. 
See Knights M., “Bangladeshi Immigrants in Italy: From Geopolitics to Micropolitics”, Transactions of the institute 
of British Geographers, New Series, Vol. 21 No 1, Blackwell, 1996, pp. 107-109
91 Canada developed a voluntarist immigration policy in terms that it is looking for immigrants, controlling as much as 
possible the process, but giving the opportunity for immigrants to come according to the special needs of Canada 
recalculated every years. Then, the interpretation of the criteria is left to the immigration agents who apply a wide 
interpretation.
See Crepeau F., “Classes of Immigrants and Immigration Levels in Canada: a Policy”, European Revue on 
International Migrations, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1986, pp. 145-164
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immense.  It  has  provided  many  advantages  for  the  American  economy, despite  the  defensive 
attitude  of  the  USA.  “Immigration  contributes  clearly  to  make  the  USA more  competitive”92. 
According to economic literature, Mexican immigrants adapt in a positive way in the labour market. 
Immigration has more advantages than disadvantages for the state and the economy93. “Immigration 
and particularly illegal immigration help to maintain the rate of profit for those agricultural and 
non-monopoly  sectors  of  capital  which  are  incapable  of  drawing  on  the  mechanisms  open  to 
monopoly capital for maintaining an adequate level of surplus”94. Migrant workers work hard and if 
they are illegal, they are fearful. The employer benefits to increase productivity and maintain a low 
cost  of  labour. Furthermore  “the  state  ensures  submissiveness  by  dealing  with  undocumented 
migrants as criminals”95. In other words, it is in the interest of the state to act repressively towards 
immigrants for the good of the economy and particularly for the agricultural sector. But immigrants 
create employment not only in the agricultural sector but in three other categories: the public sector, 
small  businesses  and  production  of  goods  and  services  linked  to  migrants.  And  the  nationals 
progress  in  terms  of  employment  to  better  jobs  such  as  bureaucrats  or  managers.  Immigrants 
“increase the wages and possibilities for diverse categories of Americans”96. They are an advantage 
for the American economy, particularly in a situation of growth97. 
If the state seeks to control immigration, and even if it is a complex process, it can try to 
close its borders. It requires an efficient policing of borders, which is affordable for most modern 
states. If the foreign population in France and Germany has kept increasing, it is also because of 
different factors, such as the foreign population having higher birth rates and lower mortality rates, 
and  thus  they  have  been  growing  naturally.  Workers within  the  E.U.  have  had  freedom  of 
movement;  a  large percentage  of  workers  who entered  both  countries  were  political  refugees. 
Clandestine  immigration has  been a  problem both before  and after  the  closing of  borders.  An 
important  part  of  the  European  immigration  is  family  reunification.  The  legal  constraints  “in 
combination with moral obligations toward historically particular immigrant population (...) account 
92 Papademetriou D. G., “Les effets des Migrations internationales sur les pays d'accueil, les pays d'origine et les 
immigrants” (The effects of International Migrations on Receiving Countries, the Countries of Origin and the 
Immigrants), Politique Etrangère, Vol. 59 No. 3, 1994, p. 673
93 This type of immigration gives advantages to the state and the economy. But those advantages are not global. They 
concern mainly employers and private companies. The state benefits from this immigration through taxes and 
economic development. 
94 Bach R. L., “Mexican Immigration and the American State”, International Migration Review, Vol. 12 No. 4, Special 
Issue: Illegal Mexican Immigrants to the United States, The center for the Migration Studies of New York, Winter 
1978, p. 537
95 Bach R. L., “Mexican Immigration and the American State”, Op. Cit., p. 537
96 Papademetriou D. G., “Les effets des Migrations internationales sur les pays d'accueil, les pays d'origine et les 
immigrants”, Op. Cit., p. 673
97 When the economy is in recession phase, immigration loses some its advantages. Employment needs to be directed 
to nationals. 
34
for  continuing  (family)  immigration  despite  general  zero-immigration  policies”98.  Therefore,  if 
immigration continues, some will say it is because of the decline of sovereignty99 but it is surely and 
partly caused by external actors, particularly for refugees.
II/ External Actors: Challenge to state sovereignty
According to Rosenau, the state in modern international politics has less power than before. 
This is due to two main reasons: interdependence, because the complexity of international relations 
gives less freedom to the sate, and the rise of other actors. The external actors in the system are 
International Organisations and NGOs. The major IO dealing with the issue of migration depends 
on the UN, the UNHCR. According to Sodako Ogata, the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees, migration should be treated not only as a matter for the UN humanitarian agencies but 
also as a political problem which must be placed in the mainstream of the international agenda. It 
should  be  seen  as  a  potential  threat  to  international  peace  and  security”100.  Rosenau  uses  the 
example of having different rules between USA and China relations, and the relations between the 
USA and  the  old  Yugoslavia in  order  to  justify  that  there  are  different  systems  within  the 
international system. One actor can have different interactions with two different actors of the same 
type. Logically, the interaction between the UN and different states can differ. The interactions will 
differ when dealing with immigration and when dealing with atomic weapons. The fact that Sodako 
Ogata had to ask for the migration issue to be added into the international security agenda, proves 
that there exists a distinction between UN relations on different topics such as nuclear weapons or 
immigration. 
The addition of those external actors (external to the state) to a political system brings us to 
Aristotle's questions, also a scholar of the political system. He asks the question as to who rules and 
who benefits, even if this question was internal to the city-state. Looking at the UNHCR, between 
23 and 25% of its budget comes from the USA101. Of course, the main part of the budget of the UN 
in general comes from OECD countries. One could consider that OECD countries rule the UN. But 
if the independence of the UN Security Council is not effective, we can consider that the UNHCR is 
independent from its financing states. The UNHCR like other IOs and NGOs in a way have the 
same interest. This is to provide security to the migrants. The migrants benefit directly from those 
organisations. In this  sense,  Sodako Ogata was  right  to  consider  migration as  a  security  issue. 
98  Joppke C., “Why Liberal States Accept Unwanted Immigration”, Op. Cit., p. 292
99 As examples: Cornelius, Martin and Hollifield
In Joppke C., “Why Liberal States Accept Unwanted Immigration”, Op. Cit., p. 292
100Sodaka Ogata, In Meissner D., “Managing Migrations”, Op. Cit., p. 71
101UNHCR Country Operation Plan 2008-2009, Country: United States of America and Caribbean
http://www.unhcr.org/home/PROTECTION/47060a552.pdf,
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Security is an important part of  migration: whether they are legal, illegal or migrating for political 
or economic reasons, migrants are treated in a contradictory way to what the principles of human 
security and human rights stipulate. External actors share this interest of implementation of such 
principles.
Human security is a political theory which comes directly from the UN and more precisely 
the UNDP. It goes hand in hand with international human rights102. This is because human rights are 
a tool for human security principles. But human security can also be a political justification for 
international  human rights.  Human security  consists  of  having  two simultaneous  sovereignties, 
where  one  depends  on  the  state  and  the  second  on  the  individual103.  The  latter  ensures  a 
responsibility of the state for the individual. Human rights can then be a tool for the international 
community or the IOs and NGOs such as Human Rights Watch to pressurise states to apply human 
security  principles.  This  includes  economic,  nutritional,  health,  environmental,  personal  and 
political security. The IOs will use them specifically for refugees. Some of the illegal immigrants 
are trying to apply for a refugee status. They would not be excluded from the principles of Human 
Security.  The  distinction  can  be  complex.  However,  this  notion  of  security  challenges  state 
sovereignty. 
This  external  actor will  interact  with the state in two ways.  The first  interaction, which 
occurs mainly with IOs will happen through political and legal international engagements. The best 
example for the migration issue is the UN Refugee Convention of 1951. It recognises a certain 
amount  of  rights  for  refugees  and political  immigrants.  It  legally  protects  persons  who feared 
persecution  because  of  their  civil  or  political  status.  Then,  if  a  state  signs  this  convention,  it 
becomes legally bound to the legal act and therefore has to apply it to its legal system. In a way, the 
convention can  be  considered  as  a  transfer  of  sovereignty because  the  state  gives some of  its 
prerogatives to the international community and the UNHCR to deal with a certain type of migrants 
in  its  territory. And  even  if  the  state  accepts  the  convention at  first,  it  can  then be  a  way of 
pressurising the state to ensure the application of the convention. The state is then obliged to take 
responsibility. “State responsibility seeks to prevent recourse to illegal acts which give rise to a 
multitude of undesirable consequences on the international plane, including the forced displacement 
of populations”104. The second type of interaction between the external actor and the state could be 
102See Leboucher Q., “Sécurité humaine et droit international des droits de l'homme: le cas des Hmongs” (“Human 
Security and International Human Rights: the case of the Hmong”), Master Thesis, University Jean-Moulin Lyon3, 
Directed by Professor Jean-Paul Joubert, 2008, 104p.
Or La sécurité humaine maintenant, Rapport de la commission sur la sécurité humaine, Presse de la fondation 
Nationale de sciences politiques, Paris, 2003, p. 27
103See Kofi Annan, Speech on the 20th  of September 1999 for the United Nations Millennium Assembly
104Beyani C., “State Responsibility for the Prevention and Resolution of Forced Population Displacements in 
International Law”, International Journal of Refugee Law (Special issue), 1995, pp. 131-137
In Chimni B. S., International Refugee Law: A Reader, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Sage 
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called soft diplomacy. For an NGO to work in the territory of a state, it needs to be in accordance 
with the laws of the state. In some states such as Laos, an NGO needs a special authorisation by the 
representatives of the single party. But most western countries let NGOs settle freely, because of the 
right to associate. But nevertheless, NGOs have to adapt to state laws. Then, diplomacy starts. If an 
NGO is protecting human rights in the immigration field, it will try to influence the state in relation 
to its power. There are also influences that an NGO cannot exert.  It cannot force a state to take 
legal responsibility. Therefore, if the NGO wants to continue its work, it has to be diplomatic in its 
relations with the state105. A perfect example of this type of interaction is the recommendations that 
the NGO can make to the state in public reports106.
Furthermore, IOs and NGOs interact directly with immigrants in their field work. For most 
of the NGOs, specifically humanitarian ones, this is their major role in the immigration issue-area. 
The UNHCR is clearly participating in this type of field work. It has offices in most countries that 
signed the 1951 refugee convention, which help immigrants with their legal status. The UNHCR 
deals with asylum demands and refugee applications. This type of interaction is done through direct 
contact with immigrants. External actors try to guarantee the rights of immigrants in practice as well 
as  trying to influence the state  to build a  system in accordance with human rights  and human 
security.  This  interaction  is  done  through  practical  help:  building  facilities,  legal  help  and 
administration, which is useful for migrants. 
III/ Migrants and their potential attempt to influence
As seen earlier, Rosenau’s first  key question around building and delimitating a system, 
centers around whether actors in the system are active. This implies that some actors could be part 
of the system without being active in terms of interactions with other actors. This is precisely the 
main question regarding immigrants in the immigration system. Can they be active in the system? 
Can they influence? Basically, immigrants in a country fall under the legal system of the state. They 
have to  comply  with  certain  conditions  when entering  a  country. If  they  do  not,  they will  be 
Publications, London, 2000, p. 296
105See the case of MSF (Médecins Sans Frontières/ Doctors Without Borders) in Thailand which has to negotiate 
permanently with the army and the state institutions to continue their work with the Hmong ethnic groups even if 
they blame the policies.  In Leboucher Q., “Sécurité humaine et droit international des droits de l'homme: le cas des 
Hmongs” (“Human Security and International Human Rights: the case of the Hmong”), Op. Cit.
106As an example, recommendations of Human Rights Watch to the state of South Africa
Human Rights Watch Report, “Keep your head down: Unprotected migrants in South Africa”, Vol. 19 No. 3(A), 
February 2007, HRW, New York, p. 13-14
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considered  as  illegal;  they  will  lose  aspects  of  legal  protection  and  would  not  be  taken  into 
consideration by society from various angles. This type of immigrants would be living on the fringe 
of society. The question is to know whether or not they can influence policies. They would not have 
an interest in influencing the external actor because it already works on their behalf. What could 
they do to guarantee themselves benefits from security, from immigration as well as the right to be 
legally considered as humans? 
There are different ways for a population to influence state policies. Fukuyama notices that 
one of Rosenau’s most important arguments is considering individuals and populations as active in 
International  Relations.  This  occurs  specifically  through  the  concept  of  a  ‘skill  revolution’107. 
Rosenau understood that populations are able to fight more effectively than previously against a 
state. They are capable of influencing a political system, and through the same principle, they are 
capable  of  influencing policies.  Lispky gives  us  key points  which look at  protests  as  political 
resources. He builds an analytic framework for protest using the example of the Black minority in 
the USA and the civil  rights  movement108.  Lipsky recognises  that  “relatively  powerless  protest 
groups cannot use protest with a high probability of success. They lack organizational resources by 
definition”109. But it remains as a way to interact with political power if there is no alternative. 
Lispky  gives  strategies  for  successful  protests.  Protests  need  “leaders  which  must  nurture  and 
sustain  an  organisation comprised  of  people  with  whom they may or  may not  share  common 
values”110. They must have goals and strategies and maximize their public exposure through the 
media. If the protest group is heard, the opposition (officials), will have to make as much noise or 
accept the situation. Because group protests are weak organisations, they need strong leaders in 
their position. Cohesion is particularly important and ideological leadership will give strength to the 
organisation. Fear is also important, as it is a manner in which to give strength to the protests. 
Prostestors also need allies, like the media to strengthen them. The courage of the protestors will 
strengthen  the  idea  and  will  gain  favour  of  the  media,  who  is  “extremely  powerful  in  city 
politics”111. Some writers consider that the success of a protest directly depends on the amount of 
publicity provided by media communication. But help can also come from lawyers and the judicial 
process. Hiring a lawyer depends on one’s financial situation. In the case of immigrants, they might 
not have the money to pay for lawyer’s fees. If the protests are heard, make enough noise and target 
107J. N. Rosenau, Along the Domestic-foreign frontier, Exploring Governance in a turbulent world, Op. Cit., p. 275
108The analysis of Lipsky comes from a particular movement. He used an empirical situation in a political and 
historical context to build a general theory on protest. However, his general theory seems a good starting point for 
the understanding of the protest as a political resource of populations. 
109Lipsky M., “Protest as a political resource”, The American political review, Vol. 62, No. 4 , The American Political 
Science Association, December 1968, p. 1157
110Lipsky M., “Protest as a political resource”, Op. Cit., p. 1144
111Ibid., p. 1151
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groups make enough of a statement, usually state institutions can use different strategies to fight 
against the potential influence of the protests. Lipsky considers six different strategies:
- “Target groups may dispense symbolic satisfaction”;
- “Target groups may dispense token material satisfaction”;
-  “Target groups may organize and innovate internally in order  to blunt  the impetus of protest 
efforts”;
- “Target groups may appear to be constrained in their ability to grant protest goals”;
- “Target groups may use their extensive resources to discredit protest leaders and organizations”;
- “Target groups may postpone action”112. 
Those strategies might make the protest useless. And there is an important chance that a protest 
would not lead to a success. But in the case of immigrants, it might be their only choice to influence 
state policies according to their interest of legal security, admission to the status of refugee, civil 
rights, work opportunities, for legal and illegal immigrants.
In some countries, protests have been a way for immigrants to be heard and influenced. The 
first issue is to know if immigrants have the right to form associations. It is usually recognised in 
liberal  democracies  of  Europe  or  North  America.  As  an  example,  in  France  and  Germany, 
foreigners “have been allowed to form associations to promote their interests and to consult with 
national and local authorities on policy questions that affect them”113. Thus, foreign workers became 
able  to be  militants.  This  has been the  case in  Italy  in the  1990's  with Bangladeshi  and other 
immigrant communities. The first political association in which Bangladeshis were involved was 
the United Asian Workers' Association. The UAWA was an alliance made up of Italians along with 
Bangladeshis, Pakistanis, Indians, Chinese, Filipinos and Sri Lankans immigrants. “In protest, the 
UAWA organized a  hunger  strike  in  order  to pressurize the  police  authorities  to recognize  the 
requests for legal residence made by UAWA members”114. “The police authorities capitulated and 
agreed to grant residence permits to UAWA members”115. The protest was a success. It had two 
main influences on the  Italian state:  “the capitulation of  the Rome police authorities  made the 
capital  a  focus  for  residence-permit  requests  from  all  parts  of  Italy”  and  “a  whole  series  of 
associations representing specific ethnic groups were established (...) following the example of the 
UAWA”116. This example shows that protests can be a useful tool for immigrants to influence the 
state  and that  the creation of  a  cross-ethnic  political  organisation is  possible.  Nonetheless,  this 
political representation is impossible at an EU level for the moment. The technocracy of Europe has 
112Ibid., p. 1155
113Hollifield J. F., “Immigration Policy in France and Germany: Outputs versus Outcomes”, Op. Cit., p. 120




brought  about  a  system that  is  not  in  touch  with  the  citizen,  and even  less  in  touch with  the 
immigrant117.
Another  way for  immigrants  to interact  and influence the  state  is  through  legal  claims, 
particularly  in  human rights  protection.  But  claims  can  depend on  different situations  that  the 
immigrants find themselves in with the host country. As Lipsky noted, the problem for immigrants 
would be whether they would be able to afford a lawyer as well as to make the claim. Therefore, 
their possibilities in this interaction will depend on the legal help that is available in the country or 
the legal aid offered by external actors. The influence will be limited to the singularity of the claim. 
It will influence the situation of the person who is claiming. The influence can grow if there are 
many claims in the same field, or if the case is considered as an authoritative precedent, depending 
on the legal system of the state.
117Ireland P., “Demander la lune: La participation politique des immigrés dans la communauté européenne” (“Asking 
for the Moon: The Political Participation of Immigrants in the European Community”), Op. Cit., p. 130
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Section 3 - 'The Vertical Approach': Organisation of actors and subsystem 
interactions
The vertical approach basically consists of looking at the composition of the actors. Because 
of  their  structures,  organisation, bureaucracy, divisions into  different groups,  lack thereof,  their 
possibilities of influence change. Consequently, it is crucial to understand their composition. If the 
composition limits the actor in its opportunities of influence, the nature of interactions will change. 
Even inside a system, there are subsystems within actors. There are interactions in the subsystems 
that have to be understood and clarified.
I/ The state: Policies and implementation. 
Realists study international relations with the state being considered as the major actor as 
well as a single unit. They do not focus on internal aspects of the state. State policies in foreign 
affairs are most of the time homogenous. For example, it is rare to see speeches between a president 
and  a  Prime  Minister  that  differ. Thus,  it  would  signify  a  lack  of  coordination.  But  in  the 
immigration system, there are internal factors that  have to be considered.  State  policies do not 
always centre on foreign affairs. There exist different actors interacting inside the state such as 
ministries or bureaucrats. The question is to know the nature of their interactions. The pluralist 
conception of the state explains that policies depend on the “ability of the government to achieve 
agreement between competing groups”118. Out side of the state, there are different interest groups in 
a country who try to influence policies. In the case of immigration, employer’s' associations are a 
particularly strong influence that allow us to know whether the economy needs workers or not119 
and what type of workers. They influence the state policy through negotiation. 
But it is not only interest groups who influence policies. Their implementation might not be 
exactly what the state had planned. To explain this process, Lipsky looks at street level bureaucracy. 
118Hollifield J. F., “Immigration Policy in France and Germany: Outputs versus Outcomes”, Op. Cit., p. 114
119See the case of France and Germany where employers' association were in favor of the immigration control and stop 
of inflows. The employers could continue to count on immigration labor due to the increase of family immigration 




This is the kind of bureaucracy that is directly in contact with the public or bureaucrats at a lower 
level of administration. They can be at the reception or in different offices. He explains that other 
theories  do  not  consider  that  citizens  and  the  public  are  affected  by  actions  of  street  level 
bureaucracy. His viewpoint looks at implementation of policies through street level bureaucracy. 
We can consider two levels, the policies formulation level and the implementation level. Lipsky 
argues that organisations often perform inversely to their own rules and favour some clients. He 
considers that “decisions of street-level bureaucrats (...) effectively become the public policies they 
carry out”120. Ideally, street-level bureaucrats respond to individual needs for the people they serve 
or confront. But in reality, because they deal with clients on a mass basis, they lose their ideals. 
Workers develop conceptions of their work and of their clients that narrow the gap between their 
personal  and  work  limitations  as  well  as  their  ideal  service.  They  face  a  dilemma on how to 
implement  their  service,  particularly  “if  their  clients  are  poor,  and  racially,  ethnically,  or 
linguistically  different  from most  of  the  public  employees”121.  In  the  case  of  immigration,  the 
interaction  between  immigrants  and  the  state  will  depend  on  street  level  bureaucrats.  Policies 
formulated by the state will be implemented by the street level bureaucrats. The interaction between 
migrants and the state will go through street level bureaucracy. 
From another point of view, P. Degeling and H. Coleback analyse the policy implementation 
by looking at the structure of organisations122. Lipsky adds that bureaucrats and their routine also 
changes policies and that they influence efficiency in administration and public service. It is a two 
way process  of  influence.  The  structure  of  the  administration  system will  change the  work  of 
bureaucrats and therefore the implementation of policies. But also, the work of bureaucrats will 
change policies through their implementation.  
The policies that the state decides to implement can be changed by administration when 
applied. If the Legislator decides to create a law about the situation and the rights of immigrants, it 
cannot be sure that this law will be implemented as conceived. Furthermore, some principles of the 
law could be changed in their application by bureaucrats. Lipsky demonstrates that the bureaucrats 
have more power than they should have. This is a result of the system in which they work. He also 
affirms that  the  power  of  making  laws  and  the  implementation  of  policies  become restrained 
because of the process. Therefore, good management in the administration is particularly important 
in the state subsystem in order to achieve a coherent legal system and the application thereof. It is 
likely to be a bigger difference between policies and their implementation in developing countries 
where administration resources are porous.
120M. Lipsky, “Street level bureaucracy”, in M. Hill, The Policy Process. A Reader, Prentice Hall, London, 1997, 
p. 389
121M. Lipsky, “Street level bureaucracy”, Op. Cit., p. 398
122In P. Degeling and H. Coleback, “Structure and action as constructs in the practice of public administration”, in M. 
Hill, The Policy Process. A Reader, Prentice Hall, London, 1997
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With immigration, policies that the state wishes to implement eventually get modified as a 
result of the way in which bureaucrats carry them out. Immigrants will be mainly in contact with 
street level bureaucrats in their interaction with the state. A state might decide on a policy which 
allows immigrants to attain legal status. Policies would not be applied correctly if bureaucrats are 
badly equipped in terms of resources and also if they misinterpret the conditions of the law. They 
might  not  be  pushed  by  the  system  to  correctly  apply  the  law. Adepoju  notices  that  African 
countries lack resources to control borders and implement immigration policies.123. Because of this 
lack  of  resources,  illegal  immigrants  are  easily  able  to  clandestinely  cross  borders.  This 
implementation is  a  limit  to  state  control  in  practical  terms.  It  is  a  process  to  consider  in  the 
interaction between the state and immigrants. An immigrant will have to face state bureaucracy in 
order to attain the right to stay. This system could be for or against immigration inflow. If a state 
promotes the right for foreigners to settle in its country, as does Canada in its voluntaristic policy124, 
and protection of immigrants through human rights,  such policies  might  not  be applied by the 
administration. The interaction between the state and immigrants is not direct. It goes through a 
process and different parts of state actors such as administration, ministry of Home Affairs, etc. 
Therefore, it has to be considered in the systemic approach on immigration. 
II/ External Actors: Organisation and Cooperation
There are also interactions within the external actors. Of course, this is not specifically a 
single institution. It is constituted by different organisations. There are different external actors. A 
first distinction between IOs and NGOs, which is a major one, has already been made. But there are 
still rules and interactions between them. If they work on the same field and same issue, which for 
the purposes of this study is immigration, they can cooperate and then coordinate their actions. All 
those organisations do not necessarily have the same objectives or ways of functioning .
The first interaction that external actors (IOs and NGOs) have is cooperation. The UNHCR 
is an example of one of the major IO’s dealing with immigrants (even if they specialize with the 
refugee issue), “no element has been more vital to the successful conduct of the programmes of the 
UNHCR than the  close  partnership between UNHCR and non-governmental  organisations. For 
123Adepoju A., “Illegal and Expulsion in Africa: The Nigerian Experience”, International Migration Review, Vol. 18 
No 3, Special Issue: Irregular Migration: An International Perspective, Autumn 1984, New York, Center for 
Migration Perspectives of New York, p. 426
124Crepeau F., “Classes of Immigrants and Immigration Levels in Canada: a Policy”, Op. Cit., p. 145 
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while the UNHCR is the symbol and manifestation of the concern of the international community 
for the problem of refugees, the voluntary agencies (...) permit this concern to be translated into 
effective measures of aid”125. The UNHCR was mandated in its statute adopted by the UN General 
Assembly in December 1950 to work with NGOs. The High Commissioner was allowed “to receive 
and disburse funds  through governments  and NGOs”126.  “This  relationship with  NGOs became 
fundamental  to the success  of the UNHCR”127.  The UNHCR has been using NGOs, in a  close 
partnership, to implement its work and objective. It used their staff, volunteers or workers, their 
network, their relation with the hosting state, and gave a financial support in return for the purpose 
of a global cooperation. There are several conditions for NGOs to work with the UNHCR. They 
have to: be legally registered at the location of their headquarters and/or where they operate; have 
the authority to operate  a bank account and keep separate  records of expenditures  incurred on 
UNHCR's behalf; demonstrate,  via official audit statements, financial audit statements, financial 
reliability. Even if those conditions are easy to achieve, they are there to protect the UNHCR from 
dealing with an unsecured and financially unsafe organisation. The UNHCR wants to be guaranteed 
that they are spending funds in an organisation that would be in keeping with their objectives. 
The same type of cooperation exists with the ICRC. The ICRC is a hybrid humanitarian 
organisation. The fourth Geneva Convention protects refugees and expects a favourable treatment 
for them. The ICRC “considers  itself  to be directly concerned by the fate of refugees who are 
civilian  victims  of  armed  conflicts  or  disturbances”128.  The  refugee  situation  is  complex  in 
international  migration.  When  the  ICRC  or  the  UNHCR  write  about  refugees,  they  are  not 
necessarily  talking about  migrants  who have  refugee  status.  Some of  them will  seek  to  attain 
refugee status. The UNHCR will attribute it depending on the definition that was created in the 
1951 UN convention. These immigrants could be given legal status, even if the host state does 
not129.  Therefore the help given to refugees is part of help given to international migrants. The 
UNHCR will help immigrants to proceed with their application. It will organise the requirements, 
offices, finance bureaucrats and control the all process. And in this situation, the UNHCR and the 
ICRC work in cooperation, as could be the case with NGO’s.
125Holborn L. W., Refugees – A Problem of Our Time: The Work of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees, 1951-1972 (Scarecrow Press Inc., Metuchen, 1975), Vol. 1, pp. 119-120
In Chimni B. S., International Refugee Law: A Reader, Op. Cit., p. 257
126Romero-Perez S., “Partnership in Action”, Refugees No. 97, 1994, pp. 8-9
In Chimni B. S., International Refugee Law: A Reader, Op. Cit., p. 258
127Ibid., p. 259
128Lavoyer J-P., “Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons: International Humanitarian Law and the Role of the 
ICRC”, International Review of the Red Cross, No. 305, March-April 1995, pp. 167-170
In Chimni B. S., International Refugee Law: A Reader, Op. Cit., p. 263
129See the case of the Hmongs in Thailand where the state does not recognise them the statute of refugees but the 
UNHCR does. This contradiction is due to the fact that Thailand did not sign the 1951 refugee convention and 
therefore is not obliged by it. 
In, Leboucher Q., “Human Security and International Human Rights: the case of the Hmong”, Op. Cit.
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In the field of international migrations, as is the case for humanitarian assistance, the role of 
organisations is crucial. “The concept of rescuing victims of persecution and violence is central to 
(the) motivation”130 of NGOs. This is why most of the NGOs' work is on a volunteer basis. They 
rely on civil society and therefore, can have a significant amount of presence in some areas and can 
be non-existent in others. Their presence can be seen in a wide scope of agendas, which includes 
both domestic resettlement of refugees and services to asylum seekers, advocacy, public education, 
legal services, development aid or to provide medical, logistical and relief services. Their style and 
reasons for these agendas vary in as much as there are numerous NGOs. If they work with the 
UNHCR, they implement goals for the IO through different programmes. 
The UNHCR first tries to establish itself in the country. In liberal democracies, its roles and 
objectives lean more towards consolidating assistance given to refugees and its  position in the 
country131. But those countries accept and support the UNHCR. They are usually its main founders. 
But  this  is  not  the case in  all  countries.  In  some countries like Thailand,  the UNHCR has an 
agreement with the state. It organised the repatriation of refugees and migrants after the Vietnam 
War and during the 1970s. But this only occurred with the consent of the state. The UNHCR thus 
has to negotiate with the state in order for it to carry out its role. The interaction conditions vary 
according to the particular state involved. 
Coordination is the second type of interaction that external actors have. Because of the high 
number of IOs and NGOs working in the field of migration, coordination is needed so that one 
organisation does not do the work of another. As already seen, the UNHCR and other IOs can 
financially support some NGOs working in selected specialist areas. Furthermore, those NGOs will 
then be active in the system depending on the agreements that were made. But also, NGOs working 
on a volunteer basis choose their role and way of functioning. They would decide what they want to 
do depending on the state authorisation. Their interactions and negotiations will be done for the 
purpose  of  coordination.  Therefore,  some  will  specialise  in  different  fields.  Some  types  of 
interaction can be carried out by only one NGO and not by all the external actors, as they have been 
previously  defined.  This  is  why distinctions  have  to  be  made  within  the  system.  If  one  NGO 
concentrates on legal aid to immigrants, another could specialise in medical aid. Their interaction 
with immigrants is not necessarily homogeneous and can be made for different types of immigrants 
as well. The UNHCR specialises in working with refugees but other IOs or NGOs might not. The 
130Winter R. P., Assisting the World's Unprotected People: The Unique Role of Non-governmental Agencies, Danish 
Center for Human Rights, Copenhagen, 1993, pp. 105-110
In Chimni B. S., International Refugee Law: A Reader, Op. Cit., p. 255
131See for example: UNHCR Country Operation plan 2008-2009, Country: United States of America and the Caribean, 
Op. Cit.
Or UNHCR Country Operation Plan 2006, Country: France
http://www.unhcr.org/home/PROTECTION/4337e2292.pdf,
45
distinction of the type of migrants for which NGOs work can be made through their country of 
origin as well as was the case in Italy with the UAWA. 
In  a  study  on  immigration,  the  different  programmes  of  NGOs  and  IOs  have  to  be 
understood.  From a  systemic  approach,  even  with  very  different  programmes,  the  interactions 
between external actors stay the same type: cooperation and coordination. They will be activated as 
soon as external actors are active in the system. 
III/ Immigrants in a host society: organisation and integration
In an immigration system, migrants will all seek to integrate into the society, at least to a 
certain level. The state concerned might treat immigrants differently, depending on their country of 
origin and their legal status. This is what EU countries do with immigrants from within the EU. The 
EU states discriminate between EU and non-EU migrants and this distinction will have impacts on 
the integration of migrants.  The state  can influence their  opportunities  of  integration.  But civil 
society also, has a “crucial role in the incorporation of immigrants into the society of their adopted 
country”132. This incorporation is fundamental in terms of the immigration issue. It can change the 
lives of immigrants as well as perceptions of immigration by the host society. If the incorporation 
does  not  work,  it  could  be  a  source  of  xenophobia.  Even  if  immigrants  do  not  seek to  settle 
definitively  in  a  chosen  host  country, even  if  they  do  not  seek  complete  incorporation,  it  is 
nonetheless a necessary process. “This process usually follows four distinct, although not mutually 
exclusive, phases: survival, organisation, consolidation and integration, all of which are facilitated 
by civil society organisations”133. But they can all be separated into two groups. Survival is often 
achieved through organisation, at least to a certain level and consolidation is processed with the 
integration. 
The  self-organisation  of  immigrants  is  a  way  to  ensure  survival134.  Any  migrant  self-
organisation will first provide help for new arrivals. As part of the same community, migrants help 
their  fellow-men.  In  the  case  of  Bangladeshi  immigrants  in  Italy,  Knights  notices  that  the 
community was the first step of organisation. Having a community is very useful for new arrivals. 
132Reitzes M. & Bam S., “Citizenship, Immigration and Identity in Winterveld, South Africa”, Canadian Journal of 
African Studies/Revue Canadienne des Etudes Africaines, Vol. 34 No. 1, Special Issue: Transnationalism, African 
Immigration and New Migrants Spaces in South Africa, Canadian Association of African Studies, 2000, p. 80
133Ibid., p. 80
134See the case of Congolese immigrants in South Africa
In Amisi B. & Ballard R., “In the Absence of citizenship: Congolese refugee struggle and organisation in South 
Africa”, School of development studies and center for civil society, University of Kwazulu-Natal, 2005, 33p.
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It  provides  familiarity. It  can  assist  in  finding  food,  accommodation  and  work.  In  Italy, the 
community  had  been  constructed  via  a  client-patron  relationship,  pushed  for  by  Italian 
organisations135. Those who have been in the country for a longer period will be the patrons of the 
new  arrivals.  This  type  of  relationship  provided  a  hierarchy  between  immigrants  of  the  same 
community. 
Beyond survival, there is political organisation at another level. The first step would be a 
togetherness that gets created for cultural reasons as well as for survival. Sometimes this is the only 
step that occurs. In this case, the creation of solidarity through political organisations would not be 
necessary  in  order  for  survival.  Lipsky’s argues  that  political  organisations  are  necessary  for 
political  influence.  During  this  process,  immigrants  of  different  communities  might  begin  to 
interact. One of Rosenau's key questions was to know if all the actors are active in the system. If 
immigrants do not create political organisations, they will be less 'active' in terms of opportunities 
of influence. Immigrants are dependent on the host country and its interests for satisfying their 
needs. A way to satisfy their needs better is to influence the host state. But to get a chance of such 
an  influence,  they  need  to  be  politically  organised.  Staying  with  the  example  of  Bangladeshi 
immigrants in Italy, this process happened successfully for different immigrant communities within 
the political organisation UAWA. In this organisation, immigrants from different communities and 
origins interacted to form a political organisation and therefore, assembled more power in order to 
influence state policies. Afterwards, other immigrant organisations were created on the same basis 
as UAWA. One was created only by Bangladeshis136. It seems that naturally, immigrants stick to 
their community. But they surely have an interest in regrouping themselves for political reasons. 
Those interactions between different communities of same or different types of immigrants are 
therefore, not always activated in the system even if they can be an important advantage for the 
immigrants.
Another part of the process of incorporation is integration between immigrants and the host 
society. Even though the political organisation of immigrants depended on themselves (and liberal 
laws  about  the  right  of  association),  their  integration  also  depends  on  the  society  itself.  For 
example, in the USA, it would be normal to be part of a community. There are Italian-Americans, 
Irish-Americans, etc. Minorities can be recognised and organise themselves. But in France, “the 
model  of  immigration  is  based  on  the  individual  and  not  the  group”137.  Therefore  in  France, 
constituting a community might be considered as a threat to the nationality and allegiance to the 
135Knights M., “Bangladeshi Immigrants in Italy: From Geopolitics to Micropolitics”, Op. Cit., p. 110
136Ibid., p. 110
137Hodeir C., Ma Mung E. & Body-Gendrot S., “Essai de définitions en matière de comparaisons internationales” 
(“Tentative Definition Regarding International Comparisons”), European Revue of International Migrations / Revue 
Européenne de Migrations Internationales, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1992, p. 12
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Republic whereas this is not the case in the USA. Some modes of integration will depend on the 
type and history of the  host  society. In countries of the  EU, it  seems too early for  citizens to 
consider being part of a European space sharing the same fears and values138. Therefore, it is not 
possible for immigrants to integrate into the European society because there is not a clear European 
society. When their political representation is already complicated by the technocracy of the EU, 
their integration has to be made through national societies. In France, United Kingdom, Germany, 
Spain and Italy, more than a quarter of the populations consider the phenomenon of immigration 
with anxiety139 (one third in Italy). Although European citizens do not feel part of a same single 
space;  sixty percent of them consider that migration issues should be dealt with at a European 
level140. But it is not happening so far. Immigrants have to integrate at a national level even if a part 
of the population is not in favour of immigration. 
The integration of immigrants can be mainly made through labour. In the USA, immigrants 
integrate well in the labour market141. Legal immigrants, like others, come from the same type of 
society which makes some people want to leave, who follow the immigration route used by their 
family  or  their  community.  “Legal  and  illegal  immigrants  share  (...)  the  same  human  and 
demographic  characteristics  and  are  therefore  in  the  same  situation  in  the  American  labor 
market”142. But “national origin is relevant to the economic integration of new immigrants”143. In 
Europe, it would be legally easier for an EU citizen to find a job in another EU country. EU citizens 
are trusted more easily in terms of immigration and work than non-EU citizens144. 
The integration form of interaction will be necessarily active in the system, at least to a 
certain level because it is a necessary process of immigration, even if the immigrants do not seek to 
settle in the host country.
138Diamanti I., “Immigration et citoyenneté en Europe: une Enquête”, Critique International, Vol. 8 No. 8, 2000, p. 75
139Ibid., p. 76
140Ibid., p. 84
141Papademetriou D. G., “Les effets des Migrations internationales sur les pays d'accueil, les pays d'origine et les 
immigrants”, Op. Cit., p. 673
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143Piché V., Renaud J. & Gingras L., “Economic Integration of New Immigrants in the Montreal Labor Market: a 
Longitudinal Approach”, Population, Vol. 57, No. 1, 2002, p. 78
144Papademetriou D. G., “Les effets des Migrations internationales sur les pays d'accueil, les pays d'origine et les 
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Conclusion
In conclusion, it seems logical to illustrate a model of the system that could be built. After 
explaining the different interactions between the actors, a model could be used as an analytic tool in 
order to clarify the situation. In the figure below, the arrows represent the different interactions and 
modes of influence used by the different actors.  Red text is  used to denote interactions within 
subsystems. 
With different interactions possible in the system, the actual influence will depend on the 
distribution of  power, of  'forces',  in  Aron's  terminology. The actors'  capacity  to  influence  will 
depend on its power in the system. An interaction by itself does not necessarily involve influence. 
This  is  what we will  examine in  the case of  South Africa.  This  model  can be applied to  any 
immigration  system.  The  question  for  all  the  different  cases  is  then  to  know  whether  those 
interaction are active or not and if they are used to influence the behaviour of actors. In a situation 
where the state does not interact with external actors, they will not be able to influence its policies 
and legal system. Such is the case when a state closes its borders to external actors, when it does not 
interact with the international community. This is not the case in South Africa, and it will be seen 
that all those interactions are active. The main issue will be to understand the specificities of South 
Africa and to look at the organisation of immigrants to understand their ability of interaction. By 
looking at this special case, we will study the influences that occurred. If the external actor interacts 
with  the  state,  did  this  interaction  lead  to  changes?  Was its  work  implemented  to  support 
immigrants in their migration to South Africa? Are the migrants able to interact? What are the 





African migration into South Africa:
application of the systemic approach
Now that the systemic analysis has been prepared for the purpose of migration study, it will 
be applied to the case of South Africa. It will be argued that African migration into South Africa 
can be studied like any other similar case. Indeed, the systemic approach permits this advantage of 
being a flexible analytic tool. However, the major limit of the comparison between European or 
North American cases of migration and that of South Africa is the fact that the states are different. 
Being the major actors ruling most of the system, differences between states will be accompanied 
by differences in the system. The interactions are of  the same type, but  the  conditions can be 
different. For example, the state will  still  interact  with external actors despite its  type. But the 
manner and the disputes on which they will negotiate will be different. 
51
Section 1- The South African Specificity
In  a  public  speech  on  the  20th of  June  1997,  Mangosuthu  Buthelezi,  the  “famously 
xenophobic minister of Home affairs”145, declared: “the question can justly be asked: what is the 
future of foreign migrants in South Africa? We just cannot allow these people to remain in South 
Africa,  especially  as  their  presence  acts  to  the  detriment  of  the  local  population...  If  we  are, 
therefore, to take the matter seriously, the flood of illegal immigrants must be stopped forthwith. 
Furthermore,  those  in  South  Africa  must  be  removed”146.  South  Africa  has  its  own specificity 
especially  with  regards  to  its  xenophobic  attitude  toward  foreigners,  African  immigrants  in 
particular. But African migration into South Africa can be studied like other similar cases with a 
systemic approach. To understand South Africa’s case, its political situation has to be explained. 
Once this is done, we will focus on the sub-systemic interaction inside the South African state/actor. 
This  will  be  done  in  order  to  explain  the  lack  of  organisation  and  functionality  in  policy 
implementation and different administrations. Thereafter, the actual interaction of the South African 
state with African migrants can be explained.
I/ The transition to democracy
The South African regime changed after the end of apartheid to become a non-racial democracy. 
Rosenau  differentiates  between  internal  personnel  change  and  internal  political  change.  South 
Africa’s change of regime does not only concern personnel. It is not only the “identity of the people 
who occupy the  governmental  and nongovernmental  leadership roles  of  the society”147 that  has 
changed. Rosenau defines political changes as involving “changes not only in the personnel of the 
governmental and political institutions; but also in the requirements, capabilities, and limitations of 
their role in relation to each other and to the citizenry”148. In the case of South African, a completely 
new regime was created. In 1970, Rosenau asked about South Africa: “If  the Republic of South 
Africa failed to resist the external pressures to end apartheid and the white minority thereby lost its 
145Landau L. B., “The Laws of (in)hospitality: Black Africans in South Africa”, In The promise of freedom and its 
practice: Global perspectives on South Africa's decade democracy, Forced Migration Studies working paper series 
University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, May 2004, p. 6
146In Sinclair M. R., “Community, identity and gender in migrants societies of Southern Africa: Emerging 
Epistemological challenges”, International Affairs (Royal institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 74, No. 2, 
April 1998, Blackwell, p. 340
147Rosenau J. N., “Foreign Policy as adaptive behaviour”, Op. Cit., p. 373
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control over the black majority, would the Republic of South Africa thereafter be treated as having 
been transformed through adaptation to the external pressure or as having been replaced by a new 
actor  because of extreme maladaptation to the  foreign demands for  basic changes  in its  social 
structure?”149. It seems clear today that Rosenau’s second option is more accurate. The new South 
Africa can be considered as a new actor in international relations because of its  full  change of 
regime, even if the changes in its social structure did not necessarily come from foreign demand or 
international pressure. Rosenau wrote this in 1970. But the situation in South Africa changed in 
1976. The change in regime was not only a result of external pressures but actually from internal 
ones. However the case of South Africa is not a miracle. Maybe the only miracle is that the regime 
change happened with a relatively small amount of violence. This is why de Klerk and Mandela 
received the Nobel Price. As a political transformation, the best theory to explain the change of 
South Africa seems to be transition theory.
The transition theory starts with a truism “that those who rule authoritarian societies do not 
voluntarily surrender  their  power and thus,  do not willingly renounce control  over  the political 
system in which that  power is  located”150.  Power  holders  are  then drawn into  a  sustained and 
intensifying confrontation with a democratic opposition that gains popular support. Because of this 
confrontation, a negotiation will be achieved between the two parties for a new democratic order. A 
revolutionary rupture can happen. This leads to two assumptions: firstly, the negotiation cannot be 
made by the masses but rather by leadership, and secondly not all the members of the opposition 
agree with the negotiation reached. There will be tensions in the opposition party. A problem can 
then arise: The opposition becomes divided and disagrees on the type of democracy that should be 
built. This new democracy could be of a political, economic, liberal or other type151. 
The above theory can be applied to the South African transition. First, its transition began 
with  an  increase  of  power  from the  people.  The  low intensity  civil  war  that  occurred  in  the 
townships  was  a  transposition  of  a  growing  idea  of  democracy, which  helped  the  creation  of 
rudimentary organs of power from the people. Since a solution could not be imposed unilaterally, a 
negotiation took place between the party in power and the opposition. The government recognised 
the futility of efforts to reform the apartheid system. The successor of the regime had to be a non-
racial Democracy. Also, those who were pro-democracy had to accept the fact that a solution would 
not be found through an armed struggle. Thus a negotiation had to be made. The conflicts brewing 
in opposing parties called for a common leadership in order to maintain calmness. The ANC played 
that role. According to Willem Van Vuuren, the result of transition consisted of a mix of strategic 
149Rosenau J. N., “Foreign Policy as adaptive behaviour”, Op. Cit., p. 384
150Ginsburg, D. “The democratisation of South Africa, Transition Theory tested”, Transformation, 29, 1996, p. 74
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elite coercion and mass violence152. The elite’s aim was to influence the process of change. But their 
attempts were not effective enough to allow any elites to unilaterally impose a change of regime. 
The masses were also needed to support the multilateral negotiation.
At the end of this negotiation, a limited form of democracy appeared. It was limited because 
the “government (was) strong enough to govern but weak enough not to be able to govern against 
important interest”153. The government was able to create and/or maintain a level of social order that 
was sufficient enough to allow the majority of citizens to go about their daily lives and routine. But, 
it  was not able “to entrench power holders in those situations where the interest of the masses 
should  take  precedence over  those  of  the  few”154.  South  Africa’s new regime was  not  able  to 
guarantee people’s interests through democratic processes like the redistribution of wealth or the 
dissolution of oligopolistic and monopolistic practices155.
After the transition comes consolidation. This is precisely the process that South Africa is 
undergoing. Consolidation can be defined “as the process by which the structures and norms of 
democracy have been firmly established and supported by the general public so that the regime 
gains persistence and the capability to overcome possible challenges and crises”156. The first step for 
consolidation is legitimation. It can be limited or totally legitimised. In some situations, legitimation 
can be partial and take time to be total, as in the case of Italy. This legitimation has an impact on the 
structures  of  elites,  their  control  on  the  regime  and  its  stability. According  to  Morlino,  when 
legitimation is restricted, a crisis will occur if elite stabilisation or the party organisation is not 
clearly achieved. When there is widespread democratic legitimacy, less party control of society is 
necessary to achieve consolidation of democracy. And when there is a widespread legitimacy, the 
partisan control of society will not be decisive for the consolidation157. 
According to the work of G. Lowell Field, John Higley and Mihael G. Burton158, in different 
circumstances, three types of elites can be considered. These elites coincide with different types of 
political regimes. The first type of elites is the disunified elite. It appears when structural integration 
and value consensus are minimal in the society. The communication and influence network do not 
then cross fractional lines between the elites. The fractions disagree on rules and codes of political 
conduct.  The second type is called the consensually unified elite.  “It  exists when the structural 
152Van Vuuren, W., “Transition Politics and the prospects of Democratic Consolidation in South Africa”, in Politikon, 
Vol. 22, No. 1, June 1995
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154 Ibid., p. 81
155 Ibid., p. 81
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integration  is  inclusive  in  the  sense  that  overlapping  and  interconnected  communication  and 
influence networks encompass all elite fractions”159. There is no single fraction dominating. The last 
type is the Ideologically unified elite. It is the same as the second type, except that a dominant 
fraction leads.
The Disunified Elite brings about an unstable regime, with  coup  d'états. This could have 
been  the  case  is  some  monarchies  in  Europe.  The  Consensually  Unified  Elite  brings  about  a 
representative regime, with some variations in the degree of representation. Lastly, the Ideologically 
Unified Elite leads to a stable, unrepresentative regime. Roger Southall uses records of elections to 
show that the ANC had between sixty and seventy percent of political party support from October 
1992 to November 1998160. The last national elections confirm that this is still the case in South 
Africa today. Therefore we can consider that  the type of  elite in South Africa is  Ideologically 
Unified at the moment, with the ANC as the dominant fraction. Even if  elites in South Africa 
include different groups such as economic elites, it seems that the ANC leads political elites and the 
population behind the ideal of liberation. We can consider the actual regime in South Africa as 
being stable, but unrepresentative of the different interests. And if a democracy is supposed to bring 
a representative part of the population to power, we can consider that the South African regime is 
not a Democracy. Democratic consolidation is a process that takes time.
The  political  situation  of  South  Africa  influences  the  immigration  issue.  Hollifield 
considered that “immigration policy is a measure of the strength of the state”161.. With South Africa 
still being a weak democracy, there will surely be implications for immigration policies. Regarding 
immigration, even if “not much (has) changed since the 1913 Immigration Regulation Act”162, the 
transition and regime change “directly influenced the inflow of immigrants”163.
159 Ibid., p. 176
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161 Hollifield J. F., “Immigration Policy in France and Germany: Outputs versus Outcomes”, Op. Cit., p. 115
162 Klotz A., “Migration after Apartheid: Deracialising South Africa foreign policy”, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 21, 
No. 5 (October 2000), Taylor and Francis LTD., p. 832
163 Ibid., p. 834
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II/  Organisation  of  the  South  African  State  and  its  influences  on  African 
Migration: Interaction inside the state actor
The consolidation and economic development phase of South Africa’s democratic transition 
cannot be as strong as the liberal  modern democracies of Western Europe and North America. 
Because South Africa re-entered the international system after apartheid, the flow of immigrants 
(legal and illegal) is simply “a very visible reminder of these new global realities”164. But the South 
African state is possibly not equipped to face those realities. Hollifield states that “the smaller the 
gap between policy outputs and outcomes, the greater the ability of the state to control employers' 
hiring practices and change market  outcomes”165.  This  is  a question that  could  be  asked when 
considering South Africa’s case. Is the South African state able to apply its immigration policies 
and control employers' hiring practices166? In attempting to answer this question, one has to consider 
that South Africa’s challenge in controlling immigration does not only centre on employers’ hiring 
practices or changing market incomes. The system is also dysfunctional.  Interactions inside the 
actors  and  subsystems  have  already  been  studied.  Those  interactions  have  a  particularly  great 
importance in African Migration to South Africa. 
Two types of dysfunctions in the South African state actor can be considered with regards to 
immigration.  Firstly,  there  were  political  dysfunctions.  When  Mangosuthu  Buthelezi  was  the 
minister  of  Home Affairs,  from 1995  to  2004,  since  he  was  the  leader  of  the  IFP, “the  ANC 
practised obstruction, attacking and sabotaging the legislation process without developing another 
clear alternative”167. It provoked a constant decline in the DHA. The problems of communication 
between the elites in power and the bureaucrats became more and more important. “The minister's 
bureaucrats  revealed  their  lack  of  competence  to  face  their  responsibilities  or  simply fill  their 
professional basic duty”168. This bureaucratic absence enforced a vision of clandestine immigration 
which proved to be problematic. The SAPS thus tried to solve the problem unilaterally. This is the 
result of a dysfunction in the organisation of the state: between the legislative process, the different 
164 Ibid., p. 834
165 Hollifield J. F., “Immigration Policy in France and Germany: Outputs versus Outcomes”, Op. Cit., p. 115
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ministries, different branches of administration and police forces. This why the HRW recommend 
amongst  other  things,  to  “increase  coordination  and  cooperation  between  DHA  and  other 
government departments to facilitate access to social services”169. A clear cooperation is needed 
between the different organs of the South African state. 
The second dysfunction in the South African state is mainly due to the implementation of 
policies.  As  Lispky explained,  the  policy implementation process  and  the  potential  differences 
between policies and their  application that  occur is  exactly the case of what happens in South 
Africa.  There  is  always a  difference between policies  and their  implementation by street  level 
bureaucrats. But the bigger the lack of organisation, the bigger the difference between policies and 
implementation will be. There is a dysfunction in different levels
One of the major problems is clearly the South African Department of Home Affairs. There 
is an “incapacity of the DHA and other public services to reform efficiently the administration of 
immigration in the post-apartheid period”170. But if the DHA did not try to reform the system, “the 
South African Department of Home Affairs has (also) shown little interest or ability in developing 
and  implementing  sound  and  effective  migration  policy”171.  There  is  an  important  difference 
between policies and their implementation. Landau considers the DHA is the “most corrupted”172 
department of South Africa. Therefore, if asylum seekers that have the right to be in South Africa 
according to International and National laws, they have to pay extra fees. This sum is unofficial, 
illegal  and  is  extracted  by  private  security  guards,  who  sometimes  ask  to  be  paid  just  to  let 
individuals  enter  the  department  freely. If  they  cannot  pay the  money, their  claim will  not  be 
processed173.  Corruption  involves  both  state  and  private  institutions.  The  “Home  Affairs  2003 
Annual  Report  indicates  that  3264  asylum  applications  (out  of  over  15000  applicants)  were 
finalised during that year, but that they issued only 1881 refugee documents”174. When the 1998 
refugee act says that a claim should be processed within six months, the Wits University survey 
discovered that a third of asylum seekers had to wait at least eighteen months175. This is why the 
UNHCR planned to “continue to support the Department of Home Affairs in clearing the backlog of 
pending  asylum  applications  during  2006  and  in  reversing  previous  trends  by  significantly 
169 Human Rights Watch, “Living on the Margins: Inadequate protection for refugees and asylum seekers in 
Johannesburg”, HRW, New York, November 2005 Vol. 17 No 15(A), p. 3
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decreasing the volume of new, abusive or manifestly unfounded asylum applications”176. If the idea 
was that the law would set out different criteria for asylum applications, the reality is that they have 
not been implemented by the DHA. If the DHA is corrupted, it is not its only problem. The lack of 
capacity  and  incompetence  in  the  DHA allows  for  corruption  to  breed  and  corruption  allows 
incompetence to flourish. This department is clearly not carrying out what is expected of them. If 
the department is  corrupted,  it  forces new immigrants who are willing to go through the legal 
process to pay extra money. Because of that, they are not following a legal process anymore. The 
corruption  present  in  the  DHA pushes  African migrants  to  use  illegal  means  to  enter  into  the 
country. 
If the DHA is not able to finalise all the asylum applications and other applications as the 
South African laws set out, it is also because this department lacks resources. South Africa is a 
developing state and therefore cannot give as much resources to its departments as modern states 
are able to. When Aurélia Wa Kabwe Segatti from the forced migration studies programme of the 
University of Witswatersrand was asked whether new policies could be implemented by the DHA, 
her answer was, “no, not in the current state of the Department (high skills deficit, overemphasis on 
control and policing, very low morale and ethics of staff)”177. This is why the HRW recommend that 
the South African state should “substantially increase the number of appropriately trained staff and 
the facilities at refugee reception offices for more efficient processing of asylum applications, the 
determination of status, and the issuing of refugee identity documents”178 and should “strengthen the 
anti-corruption unit within DHA to urgently address incidents of corruption”179. 
But the problems of policy implementation and administration of resources in South Africa 
about the African migration issue do not only happen at the DHA. “Recognising the imperative to 
address migration in building inclusive, safe, and prosperous cities does not necessarily mean that 
officials have the information or tools to do this effectively”180. In order to decentralise the power 
and the responsibilities in the Africa migration issue, local governments have to decide on some of 
their own policies. But this does not necessarily mean that they have the tools to implement them 
correctly either. 
There are also problems at border posts. “To create a more onerous, control-and-expulsion 
oriented  approach  to  migration  at  this  point  in  time  in  South  Africa  risks  forcing  people 
underground (quite literally) and therefore eroding the good will and legal practices that currently 
176 UNHCR Operation Country plan 2006. Country: South Africa. p. 5
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exist as well as undermining efforts to build on this regularized movement in the future”181. The 
same problem of corruption at the DHA will occur. African migrants will not seek to go through a 
legal process but prefer to stay illegal despite the risk. The control on immigration will lose its 
efficiency, which already stands at a low level. 
The  South  African  state  finds  it  difficult  to  implement  its  policies.  The  system  has 
dysfunctions in different parts of bureaucracy. These dysfunctions force African migrants to be 
illegal. But it is also a problem in terms of disrespect for international laws. These laws should 
equally be applied in South Africa. The rights of refugees and asylum seekers are not respected. 
South Africa disrespects international laws. It creates a “high risk of  refoulement”182 for refugees. 
Because of those dysfunctions,  IOs,  NGOs and political literature offer solutions for the South 
African state. Reports and political literature focused on immigration in South Africa a lot because 
it is considered as a problematic situation. Therefore, the way policies and the manner in which 
African migrants are treated is well known by external actors. HRW recommended in 2007 again 
that “the Department of Home Affairs, the South African Police Service, and the Department of 
Defence should ensure that the correct procedures for arrest, detention, and deportation as set out in 
the immigration law are consistently followed by state officials”183. But the South African state does 
not seem to take heed of these suggestions. It seems like the policy implementation process has not 
changed, that bureaucrats still have more power than they should have and that human rights are not 
guaranteed because of this organisational and resource issue. The key organs of the South African 
state maintain their xenophobic position on immigration.
181 Mcdonald D. A., Zinyama L., Gay J., de Vletter F. & Mattes R., “Guess who's coming for diner: Migration from 
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III/ The South African way of dealing with immigration:
Interaction between South Africa and African migrants
Firstly of all, the legal system coming from the constitution and other immigration Acts in 
South Africa seems to protect African migrants’ human rights.  But  it  is  not the way the South 
African state interacts with African migrants. With the 1994 regime change, the new power created 
a legal system that protects the human rights of its citizens and immigrants. The preamble of the 
constitution affirms that “South Africa belongs to all who live in it, united in our diversity” which 
forms a united 'rainbow nation'. As an example for migrants, “the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, the Immigration Act 2002, and the Sectorial Determination 13 (on) Farm Worker 
Sector (or basic conditions of employment law for farm workers) provide, for the most part, an 
adequate legal framework for protecting farm workers’ rights”184.  But “despite the overall  legal 
framework offering migrants in general more rights and guarantees than ever before, their situation 
in terms of human rights’ abuses, economic and social rights and day-to-day interactions remains a 
source of concern”185. In law, a distinction between the actual law and its application can always be 
made. Even if South Africa created a system to protect general human rights, it does not mean that 
this system is applied to African Migrants. As Renu Modi recognises, “states do have a sovereign 
right to protect their own citizens' interests by regulating their borders. The South African policy 
therefore is no different. What differentiates the South African policy is a total lack of commitment 
to minimum human rights standards agreed upon by the international community, to which South 
Africa is a signatory”186. The human rights abuses carried out by South African authorities against 
African Migrants are common. “The increasing criminalization of migrants from the region lends 
itself  to  the  kinds  of  human rights  abuses  that  continue  to  plague  South  African security  and 
immigration authorities”187.
Human rights laws are not applied to African migrants. This lack of implementation let 
South  Africa  create  xenophobic  policies  and  bureaucracy. South  African  xenophobia  has  been 
highly criticised by political literature, NGO and IO reports. The “non-racial and non-ethnic”188 
184 Human Rights Watch, “Keep your head down: Unprotected migrants in South Africa”, Op. Cit., p. 35
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xenophobia in South Africa was manifested by the people through the attacks of May 2008. The 
xenophobic attitude is also expressed in public policies and their implementation by bureaucrats as 
well as in public speeches. Already at the very beginning of the new regime, Mangosuthu Buthelezi 
as Minister of Home Affairs, gave a xenophobic speech. He was not blamed for this by any other 
state institution. South Africa is in the process of recreating its identity ever since the beginning of 
the new regime. Part of this process is the re-conceptualisation of the outsider. As South African 
leaders applaud the ''new cosmopolitanism, conflicts over the right to space, services, and livelihood 
have surfaced as  South Africans and African immigrants converge on the streets  of  previously 
'forbidden' cities'”189,  “the xenophobia (...)  toward outsiders, and Africans in particular, plays an 
important role in policy making”190. A SAMP survey argues that xenophobic levels in South Africa 
are the highest recorded anywhere in the world191. “South Africa is increasingly characterized by 
powerful xenophobic and exclusionary discourses centred on migration from the rest of Africa”192. 
Even the language used by different legal acts on immigration “creates a single undifferentiated 
category of alien”193. 
According  to  a  modern  vision  of  sovereignty  in  the  international  system,  the  state  is 
expected to deliver peace and prosperity. “We see these trends across Europe and North America, 
but  'semi-periphery'  Commonwealth  countries  like  South  Africa,  Australia  and  Canada  are  no 
exception”194.  In  South  Africa,  immigrants  are  perceived  as  being  a  threat  to  the  security  and 
welfare that the state should provide to its citizens. When there is a lack of security, “South Africans 
are increasingly invoking nationalist rhetoric in their efforts to resolve their disputes”195 about all 
sorts of internal political debates. African migrants are considered  a threat to nationals in terms of 
security  but also employment.  South Africa’s new regime tries to balance the injustices of  the 
previous regime through policies such as affirmative action in labour laws. But it does not want 
African  migrants  to  benefit  from  those  measures.  For  this  reason,  anti-immigrant  policies  are 
justified by national interests and brought a “legitimate private violence”196 against foreigners as 
was highly shown by international and national press in the attacks of May 2008. The South African 
from the apartheid system. 
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state allowed those attacks to happen. In a way, this was in the interest of the state and was in 
keeping with its xenophobic attitude. But by doing so, the South African state lost the monopoly of 
legitimate violence. This does not only happen with violence towards African migrants. In South 
Africa  it  occurs  that  citizens  resolve  their  debates  without  any  police  intervention.  But  such 
violence was particularly important during the xenophobic attacks. Even if such attacks suit the 
South African state's interests, the state loses a part of its sovereignty by losing the monopoly of 
legitimate violence according to Weber’s conceptions. 
The South African state’s interaction with African migrants is xenophobic in general. To 
guarantee what the state considers as its interest, the South African state seeks to control African 
migration.  It  does  this  through  repressing  a  national  threat.  The  way  in  which it  does  this  is 
specifically through not applying Human Rights guarantees. South African policies demonstrate 
“vigorous  attempts  to  control  and  discourage  both  legal  and  undocumented  immigration  and 
migration”197. As examples, Audie Klotz explains that the Aliens Control Act “increased the scope 
for repressive powers”198. Even the 1998 Refugee Act “seeks to limit population inflows drastically 
and bolster enforcement measures”199. The Department of Home Affairs declared in 1998 that “no 
one  in  the  unskilled  and semi-skilled  categories  would normally  be  accepted  as  an  immigrant 
worker”200. The barriers have been raised for all applicants, permanent and temporary, but “the new 
regulations and restrictions are directed primarily at people from other African countries”201.  To 
ensure its control over African migrants, the South African state introduced increasingly draconian 
measures  in  order  to  raise  the  rates  of  identification,  arrest,  detention,  and  deportation  of 
undocumented  migrants.  It  first  increased  the  capacity  of  the  DHA to  track  down and  deport 
undocumented migrants, then the state's strategy was to introduce a computer-based surveillance 
system.  Furthermore,  the  “DHA has  called  on  all  government  departments  to  deny  access  to 
services like health care, education, and utilities to undocumented (and other) migrants”202. Finally, 
the  state  authorised  the  DHA to  arrest,  detain  and  repatriate  undocumented  migrants  without 
allowing them access to a court of law. Deportation increased, as shown in the following graph. 
State  control  has  tried  to  be  applied  at  the  borders  as  well  as  at  the  DHA.  “The  new 
government has paid increasing attention to policing the nation's borders, introducing a new border 
control policy. The purpose of the policy is to exert state authority over national territory, as well as 
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control over the entry of undocumented migrants, contraband goods, and illegal drugs and guns”203. 
Despite  the  increasing  number  of  deportations  of  undocumented  African  migrants  from 
South Africa, control over immigration has not been a real success. The number of immigrants did 
not decrease. Those entering the country are not necessarily more skilled than before. The South 
African state made great efforts to deport African migrants. They did this despite being conscious of 
contradicting human rights that are part of the South African legal system. But this does not mean 
that African migrants will not come back. From his research, Landau found out how easy it is for 
them to come back to South Africa illegally204. Already at the beginning of the new regime, Mr. 
Penuel Maduna, Deputy Minister of Home Affairs, affirmed that “History has shown us time and 
time again that hunger and fear are driving forces which are much stronger than even the most 
sophisticated  aliens  control  measures.  South  Africa  has  become  the  country  of  survival  for 
many”205. Maybe Hollifield was right in stating that a state cannot control such a complex process 
as immigration. But what is certain is that the strategy developed by the South African government 
did not reach its goal of controlling and limiting African migration.
Table 3
203 Ibid., p. 22
204 Between 50 and 100 rands to cross the border illegally from Mozambique
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Section 2 – South Africa in the context of Africa and Southern Africa and 
its relations with external actors
Now  that  the  South  African  state  has  re-entered  the  International  system,  it  has  new 
interactions with several actors. When SADC attempted to create a regional approach to migration, 
South Africa limited this attempt. It used its hegemonic position to keep the regional situation under 
its control and to impose its point of view, which will be argued. It seems like the South African 
state is not interested in constructing a group of states which could deal with the migration issue. 
But this attitude cannot be applied to external actors. IOs and NGOs influenced South Africa in its 
position. They still do. But if the state accepted to do so, it is also because it has some interest in 
this influence. 
I/ The attractiveness of South Africa for African migrants
The African migration issue is not only an issue for South Africa. There is an old tradition of 
migration  in  Africa.  And  there  are  many  different  migration  issues.  “Few  countries  have 
immigrations laws and much fewer enforce them rigidly”206. Thus, there are a lot of undocumented 
migrants.  This  is  especially  the case  with ethnic groups that  are split  by artificial  international 
borders.  The delimitation of borders in Africa made by colonialist powers did not  consider the 
different  ethnic  groups.  This  issue  also  happens  in  South  Africa  and  particularly  with  the 
“emergence of transnational immigrant communities between the Machaze Mozambican region and 
the Vaal region in South Africa”207.  It is one of the aspects of undocumented migration in Africa. 
“Three developments are  pertinent  to an understanding of undocumented migration,  and recent 
expulsion  of  illegal  migrants  in  Africa:  demarcation  of  national  boundaries;  the  emergence of 
independent  national  states and the setting up of regulations governing immigration;  the initial 
differential  in  employment  opportunities  among  countries;  and  later,  the  general  economic 
recession”208.  During colonisation, movement was facilitated by the French, the British and the 
206 Adepoju A., “Illegal and Expulsion in Africa: The Nigerian Experience”, Op. Cit., p. 426
207 Lubkemann S. C., 'The transformation of Transnationality among Mozambican Migrants in South Africa”, 
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Portuguese who were looking for workers in different areas in their  respective colonies.  These 
movements are still happening in Africa and within Southern Africa. And states in Africa seek to 
control them. South Africa is of course not the only country that exercises forced deportations209. As 
an example, one could look at the rise of oil revenues in the 1970's in Nigeria. The deterioration of 
the economic situation in Ghana and the ECOWAS treaty of free movement of people brought a 
massive immigration to Nigeria. Wages were much better in Nigeria. Migrants did not need a visa. 
But at the end of the 1970's, there was an economic recession in the country. Foreign workers were 
given two weeks to leave (four weeks for skilled workers). At the end, the government expelled 1,5 
millions foreigners210.
South  Africa  represents  an  important  economic  power  for  the  whole  continent.  Daniel, 
Lutchman and Naidu analysed “what has sometimes in the popular media been referred to as the 
'South Africanisation' of the African economy”211. “While the major European and other investors 
focused in the 1990s on Eastern Europe, while also being generally disillusioned with Africa, South 
African capital was well placed to take advantage of the new market opportunities opening up in 
Africa”212. South Africa used this advantage properly. The trade balance between South Africa and 
the  rest  of  Africa  has  been  increasing  strongly  from  1992213.  Therefore,  South  Africa  can  be 
considered as an economic example in many other African countries. Its economic development 
gave South Africa a reputation of welfare where wages are better. This was the case in Nigeria 
during the 1970’s.
The majority of immigrants all over the world are “motivated by economic considerations” 
and “within Southern Africa, economic variables also played a role in the migration of people from 
countries  such  as  Mozambique,  Lesotho,  Angola  and  Zimbabwe  to  countries  such  as  South 
Africa”214. Migrants coming to South Africa for economic reasons believe that they will improve 
their living standard and economic resources. “South Africa serves as a magnet to those seeking 
employment, a higher living standard and brighter economic prospects”215. The size of the South 
African economy makes the allure of the country almost overwhelming to many in the region. Its 
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Ghana (1969); Sierra Leone (1968); Ivory Coast (1958, 1964); Chad (1979); Uganda (1972); Zambia (1971); 
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(1968); Nigeria (1983); Liberia (1983)
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attractiveness is important for economic migrants.
But the African migrants in South Africa do not only enter for economic reasons. Like in the 
rest of Africa, the political situation of states has an important impact on migrations. In Southern 
Africa, civil strife in both Angola and Mozambique has displaced thousands of people. South Africa 
is attractive for both economic and political reasons. The history of South Africa seemed like a 
myth for African migrants. Because of the struggle against apartheid, of the proclamation of the 
protection of human rights and the appearance of a non-racial democracy, South Africa can appear 
to be like a perfect and safe (despite the very high levels of crime) country from the outside to 
immigrate to.216. It appears to be a much better country to live in if it were to be compared to the 
political  instability  that  takes  place in  many African  countries,  such as  “persecution of  certain 
groups, denial of political rights, mass expulsions,  coups (d'état) or civil war”217. Therefore, it is 
because of its economic position in Africa, its sort of hegemonic situation in Southern Africa and 
the fake attractiveness of its political system and history, that South Africa has to be confronted 
with African migrations into its territory. 
II/ SADC and the attempt at a free movement protocol
If one were to look at the system with the migration issue-area, it has been seen that it can be 
in the interest of a state to be part of a group. With the example of the EU, states could have an 
advantage using this group to get skilled migrants from outside of the organisation and to keep its 
own skilled citizens. In order to encourage a free trade market, citizens of all the countries of the 
EU are allowed to move freely within countries of the organisation. They can settle in another 
country without needing a visa. This decision has been accepted by all the states belonging to the 
EU. The question here is to understand whether South Africa tried to do the same by participating 
in a political organisation in order to deal with migrations and possibly other issues. Of course, if 
there is an organisation which could deal with such issues, it would be the SADC.
As we saw, in Africa, one of the problems in migration is that states do not control their 
borders, they do not have policies or cannot implement them and they then need to take extreme 
216 As an example, a Congolese migrant in South Africa declared: “We believed that a country which overcame such a 
bad racial segregation and human rights violations must be the right place to get asylum and protection”. 
(Respondent No. 7, 27th of September 2002)
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measures to regulate migrations. SADC attempted to build a migration protocol many times in order 
to  regulate  migrations.  But  South  Africa  constructed  a  lot  of  obstacles.  Oucho  and  Crush 
demonstrated “how South African opposition blocked and then stymied the  SADC secretariat's 
efforts to  develop a regional approach to migration management”218.  They consider that  “South 
Africa's position is based more on a powerful 'anti-immigrationist' discourse than any systematic 
analysis of the merits or demerits of the Gaborone proposal for free and freer movement within the 
SADC”219. 
The attempt at SADC was “eurocentric”220. It tried to apply the model of the EEC if not the 
EU. The OAU is for the free movement of people too, which encourages states to sign bilateral or 
multilateral treaties on this issue (article 43 of the African Economic Treaty). SADC’s first initiative 
for a migration treaty was in 1993 in Harare. The first draft appeared in 1995 and was called the 
Free Movement Protocol. With regards to this draft, “South Africans were particularly alarmed and 
the  department  of  Home  Affairs  immediately  commissioned  an  expert  opinion  from  the 
government-funded research think tank, the Human Science Research Council  (HSRC)”221.  The 
report  was  extremely  critical.  Thus,  South Africa,  with Botswana and Namibia as  good allies, 
decided to create its own treaty. By January 1997, the Department of Home Affairs had a draft 
protocol on 'the facilitation of movement'.  Therefore,  the secretariat  of SADC took note of the 
South  African  draft.  It  redrafted  the  'Free  Movement  Protocol'  considering  the  South  African 
criticisms.  It  was  ready  in  1998 and named,  the  'Protocol  on  the  facilitation  of  Movement  of 
Persons'. 
The HSRC report was against  the objective of the first  draft,  which aimed to allow for 
complete  free  movement  of  persons  within  South  Africa  within  a  decade222.  The  goal  of  this 
protocol was based on a pre-colonial era. At that time, the absence of state obstructed the control 
over migration. The protocol argues that free movement should be established in order to get back 
to the previous freedom of movement. With a strong critique, the goal of the HSRC report was to 
build a protocol which suited the seeming interest of South Africa. This was a way for South Africa 
to build their own protocol, to reject ideas of the SADC and to continue to make it their way to do 
what suited them. They imposed their point of view, as a hegemon would. Firstly, the HSRC report 
did not recognise that there was free movement before the colonial era. Therefore it did not consider 
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that free movement should be based on historical precedent. At that juncture the original protocol 
“was to propose that governments acknowledge this reality (the massive migrations and inefficient 
controls)  and  instead  of  pouring  wasted  resources  into  trying  to  stop  it,  [they  should]  instead 
acknowledge, manage and govern it”223. Even with a non-realistic historical approach, the protocol 
understood that the political system in Southern Africa was not able to control migration and should 
therefore reorganise it instead of wasting resources. 
Secondly, the HSRC considered that the protocol would increase the unmanageable flow 
which is a threat to South African job seekers. But Oucho and Crush see the HSRC as not having 
done adequate research on SADC migrants because in fact, the number of legal workers decreased 
and the number of illegal workers strongly increased224. This argument of the HSRC was wrong. 
Thirdly the protocol planned to legitimise and regularise illegal  immigrants.  The HSRC 
considered that they would then have to be taken in by South Africa. But “the HSRC assumed that 
all  non-South  Africans  in  the  country  (almost  certainly  far  fewer  than  they  claimed)  were 
immigrants not migrants (who see themselves as temporary residents who will return home)”225. 
South Africa would not have had to take in all the illegal migrants due to the dynamics of migration 
in the region. 
Fourthly, the protocol “would mean that foreign labour migration to the mines would have to 
be  phased  out”226 and  thus,  increase  the  “influx  of  workers  and  add  competition  for  jobs”227 
according to the HSRC. But “there is absolutely no reason why non-South Africans could not work 
on South African mines under a free movement system”228. The HSRC suggested that the best way 
to  protect  non-South  African  workers  from  exploitation  was  not  through  the  enforcement  of 
minimum labour standards but rather, by not letting them enter in the first place. But abuse is more 
likely to occur when labour is illegal.
Fifthly, the HSRC considered that the protocol would increase xenophobia in South Africa, 
something that the HSRC condemns. But the implication of such a consideration by the HSRC 
“seems to be that the best way to eliminate the xenophobic attitudes of South Africans is to give in 
to their demands”229. It is clearly a very populist consideration. 
Sixthly, the protocol made a clear distinction between movement within the SADC region 
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and movement to the region from elsewhere. The HSRC report considered that this distinction was 
pointless because the regional outer borders could not be adequately sealed or policed. But the 
fundamental question was not to know whether the borders could be sealed (they are not even in 
South Africa) but whether the states of SADC wish to make this kind of distinction. The HSRC 
groups all different African migrants into the same basket.
Finally, the report encourages South Africa to have a free movement of goods and capital to 
promote development. “This is probably the strongest part of the HSRC's argument although it is 
clearly motivated by South African self-interest”230. It is the same motivation that pushed the HSRC 
to argue that free movement of people would not produce balanced spatial development. The HSRC 
considered that if South African companies would be encouraged to invest in other countries of 
SADC, it would decrease business and employment opportunities for South Africans and increase 
unemployment. So on the one hand, companies should invest in other countries to stop flow of 
African migrants in South Africa which creates unemployment. But on the other hand, companies 
should not invest in the region because it causes unemployment in South Africa. The HSRC uses 
the same argument to justify two contradictory considerations to support a single policy position. 
But  “the  HSRC  report  proved  to  be  extremely  influential  in  the  South  African  government's 
negative reaction to the Protocol”231.  It  created scientific evidence to reject the protocol. It was 
accepted by the DHA and the Foreign Affairs. 
The South African protocol on the facilitation of movement was drafted by the authors of 
the HSRC report. It had three aims: “to assert the sovereignty of national interest over regional 
considerations (...), to halt the process of free movement across regional borders at first stage (visa-
free entry) (and) to avoid committing the South African government to a phased implementation 
and a fixed timetable”232. At the end, the SADC protocol did not have too much impact beyond its 
name. All the migrants' rights were taken away. There was no reference to free movement. The new 
version “was significantly diluted”233. South Africa imposed its point of view on SADC. Today, the 
same dysfunctions that arise in the South African state also appear in SADC. “While the Southern 
African Development Community’s secretariat is ostensibly responsible for developing a regional 
approach to migration, there is no one in the secretariat specifically charged with migration matters. 
Even were these bodies to develop effective policy, the inability to implement them will also mean 
that the effects may be more negative than positive”234. Migration is still managed by states even 
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within SADC.
III/ The influence of the external actor in South Africa
At the end of apartheid, South Africa 're-entered' the international community. While there 
was  a  lot  of  international  pressure  for  the  old  South  Africa  to  change  its  regime,  the  new 
government has been willing to interact with international actors.  This also means that  there is 
interaction with external actors such as IOs and NGOs. The case of South Africa can be applied to 
the system that was built in the first chapter. The state interacts with external actors which in turn 
try to influence the state. The organisation of external actors remains the same. There are IOs and 
NGOs working together. The UNHCR was planning in 2006 to “actively promote that government 
and  civil  society  are  increasingly  capable  of  providing  protection  and  assistance  according  to 
international  minimum  standards,  with  a  gradually  decreasing  reliance  on  international 
assistance”235. The UNHCR, as an IO, funds other NGOs for special missions. Even if “not all local 
civil society organisations supported the call for international norms and standards to be adopted”, 
because  some  considered  that  “South  Africa  was  not  in  a  position  to  support  the  level  of 
humanitarian  assistance  required  of  initiatives  funded  (directly  or  indirectly)  by  “Western” 
nations”236,  they generally share this common interest  of international values to provide human 
security for migrants. In the immigration field in South Africa, the different organisations do not 
have the same role. Their coordination is done in relation to different needs. Generally, they tried to 
influence  the  South  African  state  to  accept  international  values  for  protection  of  refugees  and 
human rights, to implement them and to get authorisation to work in the South African territory to 
help migrants. 
After  the  South African regime re-entered the  international  system, “in  1995 the  South 
African government ratified the two major humanitarian instruments of the United Nations (the 
1951 Convention and 1967 protocol)  and subsequently the 1969 Organisation of African Unity 
Convention on the Rights of Refugees in Africa”237. This new legal interaction took place mainly 
because of influences by International Organisations (UN and OAU). Those conventions are now 
applicable in South Africa as is the SADC protocol on Facilitating of Movements of Persons. This 
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legal framework is added to the constitution (especially the Bill of Rights), the 2002 Immigration 
Act (amended in 2004), the 1998 Refugee Act, the labour law, the Child rights legislation and the 
Health  care  access  legislation.  This  is  what  could  be  legally  applied  to  or  useful  for  African 
migrants. There are also other international conventions signed by South Africa which could be 
applied to the issue of African migration such as the ICCPR (International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights). But their application is not implemented as much when it comes to migration. 
Compared to the international legal protection of migrants, the South African internal laws such as 
the Immigration Act are “largely inconsistent”238. This is why “a range of international and local 
human rights organisations were vocal in their demands that international standards be adopted”239. 
International  Organisations  and  NGOs  put  pressure  on  the  South  African  state  to  adopt  these 
policies.  “International  organisations  such  as  Amnesty  International  and  HRW have  certainly 
influenced policy-making  on rights  and policing issues”240.  Pressure  has been directly  enforced 
through  the  implementation  of  International  Laws  and  through  what  was  already  called  ‘soft 
diplomacy’. This can be done via recommendations in public speeches or reports.
As seen before, there could be a difference between legal framework and its application. In 
South Africa “progress has been achieved in a number of areas but long term policy vision and 
management capacity is still clearly lacking”241. It seems that the South African state had an interest 
in signing the different international conventions on refugees and migration. It could be eager to 
develop  policies  for  different  reasons  such  as  “international  standing  and  kudos  from  the 
international community”242 or that “South Africa is able to access the resources and expertise of the 
UN in the event of repatriation”243. But this does not mean that South Africa necessarily applies 
those policies. In a way, “a generous refugee policy counters the suggestion that South Africa is 
adopting an increasingly 'closed-door' policy towards the rest of Africa”244. The dysfunction in the 
South African system might not allow those policies to be applied. But on the other hand, it might 
be useful for the state to not apply them because of its conceptions of African migration. Therefore, 
the South  African state  can pretend to be willing to  protect  the international  rights  of  African 
refugees and migrants but it could also ensure that it does not have the resources to directly apply 
those  protections.  The  state  can  have  a  'closed-door'  application  of  the  international  laws  and 
national policies because of its seeming lack of resources. As the UNHCR notices, “there is no 
government programme of specific assistance to asylum seekers and refugees”245 in South Africa.
238 Human Rights Watch, 'Keep your Head Down: Unprotected Migrants in South Africa”, Op. Cit., p. 45
239 Monson T., Igglesden V. & Polzer T., Humanitarian Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons in South Africa: 
lessons learned following attacks on foreign nationals in May 2008, Op. Cit., p. 57
240 Interview with Aurélia Wa Kabwe-Segatti 
241 Ibid
242 Sinclair M. R.? 'International Refugee Treaties and their implication for the South African state”, Op. Cit., p. 7
243 Ibid., 13
244 Ibid., p. 8
245 UNHCR Country Operation Plan, Country: South Africa, Op. Cit., p. 2
71
If  Human  Rights  organisations  are  to  be  considered  as  a  “watchdog  of  South  African 
migration policy”246, they can also be useful for the South African state. Even if “the sovereignty of 
individual states (such as South Africa) becomes (...) relative more than absolute”247 because of the 
implementation of international law into the internal legal system of the states, these states like 
South Africa have an interest in doing so. State loses sovereignty but gains assistance. IOs and 
NGOs, cover up for  the lack of organisation in the South African state, even if they implement a 
system which is not clearly wanted by the South African government. They seek to implement a 
system which is compatible with international expectations of Human Rights protection, and thus 
try to influence the state in that way. These IO’s and NGO’s work directly with migrants for such 
implementation. They try to influence South Africa on its position on African migrants. But through 
this pressure, they work with the state as well and thus help it. As an example, the UNHCR “will be 
actively engaged in training the large numbers of newly recruited DHA personnel”248. 
The South African state tries to deport the maximum amount of migrants,  without legal 
protection249. The state does so either by deporting them itself (with no respect for Human Rights) 
or by letting IOs and NGOs organise voluntary ones. But they will process only some of them and 
respect of International Human Rights.  This is the difference. In 2006, the UNHCR planned to 
“actively promote and organize the voluntary repatriation of refugees to selected countries (Angola, 
Rwanda,  Sudan,  Liberia  and  Sierra  Leone)  while  facilitating  individual  safe  return  to  other 
countries”250. The International Organisation for Migration also organises repatriations. However, in 
terms of respect for international law and Human Rights, it does so via a different process to the 
South African state. This serves the South African state well. During the xenophobic attacks of May 
2008, NGOs and IOs were the first to provide material help to the victims251. This was before the 
police and before other organs of the South African state was there for any kind of support. 
The interaction between external  actors  and the  state  is  complex.  External  actors  try to 
influence the state in relation to international standards of human security. This also effectively 
helps the state to implement these laws. In a way, the South African state uses those organisations to 
create a good image of itself in the international system as well as to cover its lack of resources. 
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Even if external actors do not have the same interest as the state (the attempt to protect African 
migrants while the South African state tries to reject them from its territory), they can help the state 
in some ways. And even if they pressurise the state to apply Human Rights standards, “they haven’t 
managed to prevent an exponential increase in the deportation policy (300 000 people for 3 years 
now),  numerous  and  repeated  HR abuses,  a  general  spread  of  the  xenophobic  sentiment,  and 
recourse  to  violence  as  seen  in  2008.  They  haven’t  managed  either  to  develop  channels  of 
communication  with  Government  in  order  to  promote  and  implement  a  more  progressive 
immigration policy”252.
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Section 3 – The struggle of African migrants in the system
In the immigration system, if African migrants are considered as the actors which are the 
most directly concerned, this does not necessarily mean that they are the most active in terms of 
interactions and influence of other actors. There are many situations where they have to face a 
South African system which is not in their favour, as has been seen. But it is not only the state that 
poses  a  hindrance  to  integration for  African migrants.  The  society  of  the  host  country  is  also 
limiting. Fortunately for them, the help given by external actors can be crucial in some ways despite 
some lacks. Therefore, they have to face the system and organise themselves. But their organisation 
is often limited to wanting only survival and is not enough to influence the South African state. 
I/ African migrants facing the South African system and its society
In a public speech in 2004, Bertrand Ramcharan, Human Rights Commissioner of South 
Africa, declared that “refugees, asylum seekers, migrant workers, undocumented immigrants, and 
other so-called ‘non-citizens’ are being stigmatised and vilified for seeking a better life. They are 
made scapegoats for all kinds of social ills, subjected to harassment and abuses by political parties, 
the media, and society at large”253. As seen before, the South African state is xenophobic towards 
African migrants. But the difficulties that migrants have to face are not only from the state system. 
Xenophobia also exists inside the South African society. This is clearly demonstrated by the attacks 
of May 2008. Migrants are pushed out of society. The mayor of Johannesburg said in his State of 
the City in 2004, “while migrancy contributes to the rich tapestry of the cosmopolitan city, it also 
places  a  severe  strain  on  employment  level,  housing  and  public  services”254.  Because  of  such 
considerations, because the South African state, government and other authorities consider them as 
a threat, “local authorities have reacted to foreign migrants either by denying their presence or by 
excluding  them  from  developmental  plans”255.  This  attitude  does  not  only  come  from  public 
authorities. A SAMP survey revealed that 87% of South Africans felt that the country was letting in 
too many foreigners256. “Moreover, just under 64% South African respondents in the 2003 Wits 
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University survey found that  immigrants were generally untrustworthy and a similar percentage 
(64,8%) thought it would be 'good' or 'very good' if most of the refugees and immigrants left the 
country”257. While state organs consider African migrants as a threat, 48% of the South African 
population feel that foreigners were a criminal threat258. As Reitzes and Bam noticed from a study 
conducted in Winterveld, the integration of African migrants was better during apartheid. They 
were involved in political organisations and working legally. They were in the same position as the 
blacks of South Africa, which gave a few (even if very few) advantages in terms of integration. But 
since the end of Apartheid, African migrants are in different position. “The current South African 
debate on "illegal" immigration is heavily influenced by claims that immigrants have a negative 
impact  on the  South African economy and society more  particularly, that  immigrants  consume 
resources to which South Africans are entitled, and are responsible for rising crime”259. African 
migrants are not welcomed in the country. South Africans have misconceptions about migrants. 
“While South Africans perceive that many immigrants are engaged in crime, our evidence does not 
confirm the  accuracy  of  these  perceptions.  On the  contrary, the  insecure  status  of  immigrants 
actually contributes to rising crime of which they are victims”260.  Even if  African migrants are 
involved in crime, they are probably less involved that what is perceived. The problem is to find 
true information about the proportion of migrants that are involved in crime. However, they are still 
soft targets for criminal activity.
Because  a  bad  image  of  African  migrants  is  promoted  in  South  African  society, these 
migrants have to face difficulties in very different parts of their interaction with society and the 
legal system. In their interaction with the state, there are mainly “four areas in which anti-immigrant 
sentiments are having significant practical consequences: accessing Department of Home Affairs 
buildings;  acquiring  adequate  identity  documents;  securing  financial  services;  and  migrants’ 
engagement with the state’s coercive apparatus”261. As has been seen before, the DHA is corrupt. 
Migrants have to pay extra money to have access to documents. The security guards “not only (...) 
regularly extract bribes just to allow entry, but  (...) frequently resort to beatings and other violent 
means to keep people in line in both a figurative and literal sense”262. When the asylum seekers wait 
for their demands to be processed (which takes more time than it should be according to a Wits 
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survey), they are not allowed to work or study263. It creates a “criminal class”264 because they have 
to break the law to survive, either by working illegally or by making fake identity documents. 
While they wait for their identity documents at the DHA, a single hand-written document is given 
to them: the 'Section 22'. The policemen are aware of this and use it to exploit their vulnerability. 
The situation also arises where incorrect IDs are given to migrants by the DHA, which contain 
mistakes such as incorrect names or birthdates265. 
African migrants are in a position of social exclusion which means a “lack of entitlement to 
social-economic basic  needs including employment  in both informal  and formal  sectors,  social 
services such as education, health care,  equal protection by the police,  and equality before the 
law”266.  “Many (African migrants) with rights to social services are often denied access to critical 
social services”267. For example, despite the right for African migrants to enrol their children in 
school, a study in Johannesburg found that 70% of Somali refugee children of school-going age 
were  not  enrolled268.  A  national  study  of  refugees  and  asylum  seekers  found  that  17%  of 
respondents  had  been  denied  emergency  medical  care269.  “Whenever  they  go  for  medical 
consultation in public hospitals, the first  question is 'Why did you come to South Africa and when 
are you going back home?'”270.
African migrants have difficulties finding work too. As an offence against the Human Rights 
Convention signed by South Africa, according to the HRW, it is a “violation of the Immigration Act 
(...) for an employer to hire a foreigner whose immigration status is illegal”271. One could use the 
example of Congolese refugees, who often work as security guards. Now it is stipulated that the 
Security Officers Board (SOB) should register everybody who wants to work in the security guard 
industry. Congolese no longer have access to this registration (and therefore) go underground and 
either become registered through bribery or false SOB registration numbers”272. “The lack of access 
to formal employment and the xenophobic attitudes of some South African civil servants including 
Home  Affairs  officials,  police  and  city  officials  constrains  Congolese  refugees  to  work  under 
conditions in which employers, both South Africans and well established refugees, and employees 
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disregard South African labour law in terms of contracts and working conditions”273.
The most difficult situation that African migrants in South Africa have to face is probably 
the  violence  that  they  have  to  go  through.  For  the  police,  arresting  an  immigrant  is  a  good 
opportunity. This is easy if one were to consider the quota of arrests they have to make. They 
usually do not acknowledge their  documents or they destroy them on the spot.  Immigrants  are 
therefore “vulnerable to arbitrary arrests and detention”274. And because most South Africans see 
immigrants as a source of crime, they see it as good for the police to arrest some of them, thus 
showing their will to fight against crime. The HRW denounces the violence that African migrants 
have to suffer. This includes “extortion of money and other property from them by police, military, 
and immigration officials”275, “deportation without an opportunity to collect remuneration, savings, 
and  personal  belongings”276,  “detention  not  in  compliance  with  legal  standards”277,  “unlawful 
detention of children”278, “unlawful detention of those awaiting deportation with convicted prisoners 
and those awaiting trial”279. 
The system that African migrants have to face does not encourage them to stay. But  because 
they are “denied the opportunity to participate meaningfully in civil society and to engage positively 
with the state, they will increasingly devise strategies of avoiding or outwitting the state”280. For this 
reason, external help can be precious for them.
II/ A fortuitous assistance from the external actor
The external actor’s assistance to African migrants has been crucial for their integration in 
South Africa. However, because of its position in the system, help has not been always consistent. It 
has been directed primarily towards refugees and those in crisis situations. 
Refugees  have different expectations  of  the  kind of  help  that  they could receive.  Their 
expectations  “accord  with  their  knowledge  of  the  1951  UN Convention2  and  the  1969  OAU 
Protocol  of  African Refugees”281.  If  the  example  of  Congolese  refugees  were  to  be  used,  “the 
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aspirations and hopes of Congolese refugees vary according to an individual’s age, marital status, 
and family size, level of education back home, previous occupation and standard of living. But 
these aspirations also are influenced by experiences back home where the UNHCR fully supported 
refugees from other countries and hence refugees expected the same level of assistance in South 
Africa”282.  But the situation and the help given to African migrants could be different in South 
Africa, because of its system.
There are different types of organisations which complement external actors in South Africa. 
Their main objective is to support refugees. The major type of organisation is the service-provider 
NGOs  and  their  funders,  primarily  the  UNHCR,  (...)  the  major  funder  of  refugee-support 
activities”283. As has been seen in the systemic approach, some IOs fund NGOs to do their field 
work. This also happens in South Africa. “The UNHCR interprets its role to be one of monitoring 
South  Africa’s implementation  of  the  1998  Refugee  Act,  assistance  with  the  creation  of  an 
environment that integrates refugees into South Africa, temporary assistance to refugees, assistance 
to  local  government,  and  assistance  with  specific  solutions  such  as  voluntary  repatriation”284. 
Because South  Africa  is  a  middle-income country, it  can therefore provide its  own support  to 
refugees. The UNHCR focuses more on funding “local service providers”285. An example of this is 
Lawyers for Human Rights. It helps “individual refugees with their applications and other legal 
concerns”286. Twenty lawyers have been seconded into the Department of Home Affairs in order to 
speed up the  processing of applications.  Another  NGO funded by the UNHCR is the National 
Consortium for Refugee Affairs. “It facilitates communication at a national level on refugee related 
concerns”287.  The UNHCR also funds NGOs in each of the Refugee Reception Office found in 
major cities. 
An additional category would be “refugee forums, networks and coordinating bodies which 
attempt to bring together all refugee communities in a city to address common concerns”288. They 
attempt to bring together all  stakeholders to address refugee needs. But it seems that they have 
struggled to succeed. 
The last category in the external actor would be refugee-run NGOs, political parties and 
churches.  This  is  basically  constituted  by  civil  society  in  small  organisations.  They  do  not 
necessarily work for refugees. As an example, “in Johannesburg, one woman refugee has founded 
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an NGO to address women’s concerns”289. 
The work done by IOs and NGOs covers many spheres. They are active in many different 
domains.  Since  they  focus  mainly  on  refugees  issues,  they  can  also  help  African  migrants. 
However, sometimes this does not seem like enough, considering all the difficulties that migrants 
have to face. They depend on civil society and volunteers for small organisations. While African 
migrants  are  confronted  by  xenophobia,  civil  society  does  not  engage  a  lot  in  helping  them. 
However, the situation does change when there is a crisis. This was the case during the attacks of 
May 2008.
During those attacks, the government had difficulty in managing the crisis because it was 
new and immense in terms of the number of displaced people. “UN agencies and NGOs played a 
significant role in responding to the disaster in South Africa”290. But in line with the system, they 
had  to  wait  for  state  authorisation  to  be  active.  However,  the  help  given  by  International 
Organisations and civil society has been crucial. 
We can divide the humanitarian help  into  three phases.  The first  phase was emergency 
assistance. It consisted of the provision of shelter, including emergency research and planning as 
well as lobbying for safer places, provision of food and non-food items (for babies, clothes, tents, 
blankets,  etc.),  personal welfare with medical  assistance and medical  support,  protection of the 
Internally Displaced Persons. Then the second phase called “camps and norms and standards”291, 
had  the  objective  of  relocating  the  IDPs.  It  also  continued  to  provide  material  and  personal 
assistance to IDPs as well as security protection. It is in this phase that the South African state 
started to be  active,  particularly  with  regards to  relocation of  the  IDPs.  The phase centred  on 
reintegration  and  camp closure.  It  consisted  of  lobbying  for  better  conditions  for  IDPs,  camp 
closure, continuing the material and personal assistance. The protection of IDPs during this phase 
also included assistance with legal documents for African migrants.
The UNHCR was “confined to playing an advisory and training role”292 during this crisis. 
The UNHCR maintained its role in the system. It acted as an advisor, surveying the crisis and 
funding civil society organisations to do the field work. However, NGOs “were involved in both 
advisory and direct assistance roles”293. Their coordination and cooperation with different external 
actors has stayed the same. In general, they were involved in different roles such as planning and 
management (UN agencies helped to plan the facilities, with the management of camps and the 
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process  of  reintegration and voluntary repatriations),  training of  government  officials,  technical 
expertise with disaster management structures, and practical services. 
In  this  crisis,  the government  took a  while  to start  being active.  Its  role  can be  highly 
criticised. However, in a paper on the 12th of September 2008, the Gauteng Provincial Government 
noted that it cost 20 million Rands to provide shelters, food and security to the IDPs294. The same 
paper noticed that “the government of the Republic of South Africa (does not) provide the same 
(services)  to  the  poorest  of  South  African  citizens”295.  The  situation  is  complex  for  African 
migrants. The help they receive might not be enough. As Crush and Mcdonald noticed, local groups 
that represent migrants/refugees have made very little progress in their effort to combat xenophobia 
in the country”296. It is up to them to make themselves recognised as being part of the population 
living in the country.  
III/  The  importance of  organisation for the  purpose of  survival,  more than 
influence
 
As  all  migrants  and immigrants  do  when in  other  countries,  African migrants  in  South 
Africa first seek to meet people of their community or ethnic group of origin. In those communities, 
they organise themselves for survival. For example, there are about seventeen different Congolese 
groups in Durban and eleven in Cape Town297. This reflects home base communities. They stay in 
their groups in order to support each other through the struggle that they face in South Africa298. 
These organisations have different purposes. The main one is to provide help to other members and 
to new arrivals. They meet irregularly. Everybody has to donate a bit of money at meetings. The 
money collected is used for collective expenses such as funerals or to welcome newcomers299.  “In 
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fact social networks play a crucial role in Congolese refugees' lives and constitute a reaction to the 
social  exclusion  they  face in  Durban”300.  Those  groups  already existed  in  Congo as  a  type of 
decentralisation or organisation by the colonial power. This is exactly the type of interaction that 
migrants  could  face  in  a  system,  in  order  to  ensure  their  survival  or  fight  against  a  lack  of 
integration. But those communities also deal with issues of cultural identity and security. In the case 
of Congolese refugees, most of them wish to return to DRC and do not seek to settle in South 
Africa301. It is why they try to protect their cultural identity for the sake of themselves and for their 
children. These types of organisation between African migrants occur everywhere in South Africa 
and in all the different communities. But communities don't mix. They are composed of migrants 
from the  same ethnic  group or  origin.  Even if  those  organisations work  on the  same basis  as 
political parties do, they are not political. African migrants often consider it to be more important to 
keep their culture than to influence policies and their situation in the host country302. The purpose of 
such organisations is survival. It is one way to recreate a home community.
If  the  African  migrants  want  to  influence  the  South  African  state  and  its  immigration 
policies, their survival organisations are not enough. Either they can use those organisations and 
develop  them  in  a  political  way  or  they  could  create  new  ones,  such  as  political  parties  or 
associations in order to be heard politically. This is a process that does not develop as much as it 
should.  To follow  the  case  of  Congolese  migrants,  there  is  no  political  organisation  amongst 
Congolese refugees. They have built some kind of political parties, but they are only concerned 
with  the  political  situation in  Congo or  DRC. Since they preferred  to  organise themselves  for 
cultural  reasons,  they prefer  that  their  political  organisations work on situations of  their  home 
country, instead of focussing on fighting for their interests in South Africa. In a survey done in 
Winterveld about migrants in the region, one South African respondent said: immigrants are the 
cause of their own predicament and can blame no one, but must learn to stand up and fight for their 
rights”303. It is exactly this question which needs to be answered. Do African migrants then fight for 
their rights? In other words, do African migrants try to influence South African state policies in 
order to have human rights apply to them too?  It seems like this should be the only solution.
There are only a few political organisations created by African migrants. Lispky stated that 
300 Ibid., p. 26
301 From a sample of Congolese refugees in Durban
In Amisi B. & Ballard R., “In the Absence of citizenship: Congolese refugee struggle and organisation in South 
Africa”, Op. Cit., p. 10
302 Ibid., p. 12
303 Reitzes M. & Bam S., “Citizenship, Immigration and Identity in Winterveld, South Africa”, Op. Cit., p. 88
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protests need organisation in order to succeed. But African migrants’ protests lack organisation. 
Despite this, they did manage to create some types of organisation for protesting and thus tried to 
influence the South African state. Since the Congolese are particularly interested in the political 
situation in DRC, they protested just  before a meeting organised by the UNHCR on the World 
refugee day, against Rwandan aggression in the DRC. “It ended at the city hall (in Durban central) 
where a statement was read out. No press were there to hear it”304. If the press does not give a 
stronger  attention to  the  protest,  it  has a  lesser  chance of  success,  as Lipsky states.  But  some 
protests were directly linked to the African migrants' situation in South Africa, which were against 
services  in  South  Africa  and  local  NGOs.  For  example,  one  in  Durban  was  about  the  badly 
distributed funds of the UHNCR by the Durban Refugee Forum, in April 2000. “Episodes such as 
these are interesting as they represent at once the willingness of refugees to take to the streets and 
the  complicated  political  identities  they  wish  to  express”305.  Another  example  would  be  when 
Ethiopian  asylum seekers  supported  by  the  Ethiopian  Community  Committee,  marched  to  the 
Union Buildings in Pretoria to appeal for refugee status306. African migrants also protested against 
xenophobia. In 2002, a refugee was killed for his cell phone in Durban. Other refugees and migrants 
decided to march in front of parliament before the funeral. This march is interesting in the way that 
the  idea  came from Congolese  refugees  but  was  supported  by  other  migrants.  Sometimes,  the 
communities will open and understand that they can work on a common interest. A major part of 
the protests are directly against the Department of Home Affairs. Most of them were planned and 
therefore organised. But in some cases, “it was suggested (by African migrants) that an absence of 
marching resulted from an absence of organisation rather than general satisfaction amongst refugees 
with their conditions”307. The lack of organisation and resources is a very important limitation to the 
potential influence that African migrants could have on the South African state. Some would like to 
protest, but they are held back by fear. “The National Consortium for Refugee Affairs confirmed 
that those who have taken action have, at times, been victimised”308. Their fears and the violence 
used against them can give strength to the protest as Lipsky noticed. But it  remains as a limit, 
particularly because the press does not  report  the protests of African migrants.  So far, African 
migrants have not succeeded in being heard and influenced by the South African state. If external 
actors’  help  is  crucial  for  their  survival,  some  could  say  that  “without  strong  regional  or 
international pressure it is unlikely that (legal or illegal) immigrants influence will counter-balance 
the prevalent 'democratic xenophobia' that represents a broad based constituency for most South 
304 Amisi B. & Ballard R., “In the Absence of citizenship: Congolese refugee struggle and organisation in South 
Africa”, Op. Cit., p. 8
305 Ibid., p. 4
306 More detailed in Klotz A., “Migration after Apartheid: Deracialising South Africa foreign policy”, Op. Cit., p. 842
307 Amisi B. & Ballard R., “In the Absence of citizenship: Congolese refugee struggle and organisation in South 
Africa”, Op. Cit., p. 8
308 Ibid., p. 7
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African politicians”309. 
There is another way for African migrants to influence the South African state. This could 
be through the legal system, via legal claims at different courts throughout the country. Some have 
been successful.  “For example, the court (supreme court) ruled in 2004 that the provisions of the 
Social Assistance Act, 1992 (No.59 of 1992) that reserved social assistance benefits for only South 
African citizens were unconstitutional and had to be extended to permanent residents but not to 
“illegal  foreigners”  and  temporary  residents”310.  This  case  is  interesting  in  terms  of  influence 
because the principles of the court were followed by the Social Assistance Act in 2004. As another 
example,  the  Supreme  Court  considered  that  the  procedures  for  asylum  seekers  were 
unconstitutional because the only document they had did not provide any security against detention 
or arbitrary deportation, while they were waiting for their application to be processed311. But this 
way of influence helps the individual. It does not work on a mass basis. Even if the above examples 
became authoritative precedents or changed the policies, they are rare. And the opportunities for 
African migrants to present themselves in court are few. They do not have the resources. As already 
seen, they could be deported before they have a chance to go to court. And this process does not 
secure their chances of staying in the country. Even if the Supreme Court considered the procedures 
for asylum seekers as unconstitutional, asylum seekers are still not allowed to study or work while 
they wait for their permit. The possibilities for African migrants to influence the South African state 
are few and even less frequently used because of a lack of resources and organisation. Maybe it is 
also  because  African  migrants  do  not  appreciate  the  importance  and  benefits  of  regrouping 
themselves  for  the  sake  of  power.  Because  they  can  almost  only  rely  on  themselves,  their 
organisation for the purpose of their survival is crucial.
309 Klotz A., “Migration after Apartheid: Deracialising South Africa foreign policy”, Op. Cit., p. 842
310 Human Rights Watch, “Keep your head down: Unprotected migrants in South Africa”, Op. Cit., p. 37
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CONCLUSION
Some transnational studies312 on migration in South Africa focus on different units of 
analysis  with  regards  to  migrants.  As  Crush  and McDonald  understood,  “in  many analyses,  it 
appears  to  be  nothing  more  than  a  vague  descriptive  shorthand  for  an  ethnic  or  spatial 
agglomeration of  immigrants (“immigrant  communities”),  the source area  from which migrants 
originate (“home communities”), and the bundle of transnational activities and flows that link the 
two (“transnational communities”)”313. Because of this assumption, they consider that studies of 
trans-nationalism should focus on different units of analysis, especially in the case of South Africa. 
“Communities are what migrants (not researchers) make of them”314. Therefore they prefer to focus 
on two alternative concepts at an analytical level: 'the transnational household' and 'transnational 
migrant  spaces'”315.  Using such a  unit  of  analysis  completely changes  the  focus  and results  of 
research on migration. With such studies, it seems logical that they would explain the reasons for 
migration,  the  every-day  life  of  migrants  and  their  expectations.  The  researches  on  trans-
nationalism are able to compare different origins and different migrants. They prefer to speak about 
migrants’ spaces more than migrant communities. It is a fact that communities often get separated 
during  the  migration  process.  In  South  Africa,  there  exist  settlements  or  townships  where 
immigrants live together, despite the fact that they come from different communities. Although it 
has been seen that migrants seek to regroup themselves in keeping with their communities, one 
could also observe that they live in spaces that are not necessarily regrouped by communities. Such 
studies on trans-nationalism are interesting in order to understand the interaction between migrants 
and local populations in some areas. But their focus is narrow when looking at migration in South 
Africa from a broader perspective. 
Such analyses bring about interesting questions or can alternatively offer solutions.  This 
thesis saw African migrants as a group. Because some of the expectations as well as the conditions 
that they share are the same, they could have been considered as a group, a unit, an actor, in the 
systemic approach. As it has been seen, all migrants interact with the South African state in the 
same way: they suffer because of the same system, and most of them (according to their economic 
or political migrant status) received the same kind of help by external actors. The systemic approach 
permitted not only the observation of actors as a whole, but also of interaction within the actors 
312 Meyers would have considered such studies in the 'National Identity' category because of their focus on identities to 
follow the distinction made in the introduction.
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themselves. In these parts, organisational issues were able to be understood. This is where the study 
of trans-nationalism could be included. It could explain the lack of African migrants’ organisation. 
If they live in new spaces with other migrants and local populations, they could interact as a group, 
and become organised in order to defend their rights. But it seems that African migrants do not 
follow this path. Since South African society is fragmented, African migrants are too. When Lipsky 
considered that a protest had to be organised in order to influence, it seems that African migrants 
are  not  organised enough  to  be  able  influence  the  South  African  state.  Such studies  of  trans-
nationalism can explain sub-systemic interactions within African migrants. 
If African migrants do not become organised for purposes other than survival, if they do not 
seek to influence the  South  African state,  it  is  also  because they are  proper  migrants  and not 
immigrants. Despite the increasing number of refugees and asylum seekers in South Africa, most of 
the migrants are coming for work or business purposes, when it is not about shopping or visiting 
family and friends316. Half of the migrants from Zimbabwe, Lesotho and Mozambique consider that 
people should be able to cross freely the borders as a “basic human right”317. African migrants are 
against state control on immigration. If South Africa considers the free movement of population as 
a high risk, African migrants do not want to stay in South Africa318. So if they would like to be able 
to move freely in Africa or to come freely to South Africa, it is with no intention to stay. So there 
are African migrants coming to South Africa every year, but there are also migrants leaving South 
Africa at the same time. This does not take into consideration those that are deported by South 
African authorities. 
As already seen, the South African state considers African migrants as a threat, and is fearful 
of them. But after knowing why African migrants enter the country and for how long they stay, it 
seems that this fear is unjustified. The state has created a lot of resources to control borders and to 
expel African migrants. It seems that the money which is spent is pointless. But if African migrants 
choose to not stay in South Africa, it could be because of the reaction that they receive from the 
state. Because they are considered as a threat, they might not want to stay. The causality between 
state  policies  on  immigration  and  African  migrants’  intention  of  not  staying  cannot  be 
demonstrated. As it has been seen, the state created a system which is completely against African 
migrants entering South Africa. Is it for this reason that migrants do not want to settle in South 
Africa? There is no clear answer to this question. But it seems that the choices of African migrants 
316 See Mcdonald D. A., Zinyama L., Gay J., de Vletter F. & Mattes R., “Guess who's coming for diner: Migration 
from Lesotho, Mozambique and Zimbabwe to South Africa”, Op. Cit., p. 823
317 Ibid., p. 830




are not influenced by state policies. From the different studies done on African migrants, it has 
previously been illustrated that they seek to regroup themselves amongst their own community. 
Even when living in South Africa, they prefer to maintain the same way of life that they live in their 
country of origin. Therefore, it seems natural for African migrants to not want to settle in South 
Africa. They come for political reasons when their country of origin is unstable. But as has been 
seen with the example of the Congolese, African migrants also protest in South Africa about the 
situation in their own home country. They seem more concerned about the political situation in their 
country than by their own situation in South Africa and all the difficulties they have to face. In a 
way, they are waiting for the opportunity to go back home. After the attacks of May 2008, some 
migrants, including refugees recognised by the UNHCR, did go back home. They considered that 
they would prefer to face the political instability such as wars or conflicts in their home country 
rather than staying in danger in South Africa. They were not in a safer position in South Africa. If 
South Africa accepts to receive refugees from the rest of Africa, it also has a commitment to fulfil 
this engagement right until the end. But this is not the case, as it does not offer a safe place for 
refugees. In a way, they return because of this or they try to go somewhere else. Some African 
migrants also come for economic reasons. In such cases, they come for a short period to find a job, 
get money that they send back home, and then return to their home country. Some come temporarily 
only for business reasons, where they sell goods or other products. As informal trading is highly 
developed in Africa, in some way, they contribute to the economic trade between African countries. 
But they do not necessarily leave the country because state policies force them to. 
Even if it is clear that the South African state creates a system which does not encourage 
migrants and immigrants to enter, it is unclear whether this system had such an important impact 
compared to the resources invested on migrations. Would there have been more migrants entering 
without such policies? It seems that this question cannot be answered at the moment. But what is 
sure is that South Africa has spent many unnecessary resources on immigration control. It does not 
seem in its interest when this country has one of the world's biggest economic inequalities in its 
population.  Therefore,  there  must  be  another  reason  for  the  state  to  act  this  way. Despite  the 
external actors' influence, the South African state needs to define its own identity, it needs to define 
a nation to ensure a united population. South Africa seeks homogeneity by including very different 
populations, colours and cultures, who at one time fought against each other. Judging from the 
state’s  reactions,  it  seems  like  the  only  thing  that  South  Africans  have  in  common  is  their 
nationality. This is also what differentiates them from foreigners. Thus one could say that South 
Africa uses foreigners to define its identity. The government and the ANC use foreigners to resolve 
internal issues such as crime when “immigrants have made a considerable contribution to the South 
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African economy”319. Even though South Africa is a rich country in terms of natural resources and 
cultural diversity, the ANC could find a better solution to unify the South African population. But 
South African citizens continue to vote for this party, giving it a large majority. The fact that they 
continue to vote for this party is due to the fact that the ANC 'liberated' the country, being the major 
and most organised combatant against the apartheid regime. But this party does not seem to act for 
the South African population's interest and even not for the country's interest when it comes to 
immigration. 
An  important  issue  in  systemic  approaches  is  the  stability  of  systems.  Studies  in 
international relations define a system according to its structure. But this does not seem necessary in 
this study. The question is not about knowing whether one, two, or more of the actors rule the 
system. The system built in the first chapter can be an adequate model for analysing immigration 
issues. In applying it to South Africa’s case, a clear understanding of the role of the different actors, 
their organisation, and how they could influence can be seen. The systemic approach could also 
include different types of studies in different parts of its  application. As an example, domestic 
studies can be part of the systemic approach in the understanding of the state/actor organisation. 
One consideration could be added, the system built in the first part had been constituted with the 
example of modern states. There is a clear difference in the way states can control immigration 
between  modern  states  and  developing  states.  But  the  systemic  approach  is  an  analytic  tool. 
Therefore, when applying a system, such differences could have been considered in the vertical 
approach of the state/actor.
In the immigration system, despite an influence of external actors, the state remains the main 
actor. Since it is a political issue, the state controls the system at different levels. For example, it 
decides whether it wants to interact with external actors, even if such interactions become more and 
more common in the world system. If changes occur, it will mainly be because of the state. External 
actors seek to influence it, but cannot directly decide on the immigration issue. 
Because the South African state still considers African migrants as a threat, it seems that 
their situation will remain the same. The system will thus remain stable. Laws, policies and external 
help might change but interactions in the system might not. The model built at the end of the first 
chapter can be seen as correct and stable for many cases of immigration. Therefore, the conceptions 
of Rosenau gave the opportunity to build and apply this system. If Rosenau explained how to use 
systemic  approaches  to  different  studies,  this  thesis  applied  his  conceptions  to  the  issue  of 
immigration. As a result, the test seems successful. Using Rosenau’s approach gave the opportunity 
understand better immigration issues and the case of South Africa. If such conceptions can be so 
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useful, they probably should be used in other studies. Also, if the systemic approach explains well 
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